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IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVE HAZARDOUS
WASTE LEGISLATION: CORPORATE OFFICER
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, protection of the environment was only a slight concern
of the American people.' The public thought that natural resources were
almost limitless in supply, and waste generated from the exploitation of
these resources was randomly discarded. The public considered any adverse
effects of discarded waste as secondary to the interests of the producer of
the waste.2 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, public awareness of the natu-
ral environment's frailty strengthened.' In response to this public aware-
I. Public awareness of environmental concerns began to rapidly elevate in the 1960s.
Ways, The Environment. A National Mission for the Seventies, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION 1 (1971). However, there have been some noteworthy exceptions, such as John Muir and
Teddy Roosevelt, two influential individuals who championed the cause of environmental pres-
ervation when few others had such concerns. E. MURPHY, MAN AND HIs ENVIRONMENT: LAW
35, 119 (1971).
2. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 129-31.
3. Ways, supra note I, at 1. In addition, in the 1970s a new brand of criminal activity
known as illegal hazardous waste disposal emerged in the United States, especially in the
Northeast. D. REBOVICH, UNDERSTANDING HAZARDOUS WASTE CRIME: A MULTISTATE Ex-
AMINATION OF OFFENSE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS IN THE NORTHEAST 5 (1986). But
see 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985) (originally enacted as the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152). This act prohibited the discharge or deposit of any
refuse into navigable waters, except for that refuse which flowed from streets and sewers, as
early as 1899.
Due to the increased amount of pollutants in the environment, litigation over environmen-
tal injuries has likewise increased. Indeed, some authorities believe that within ten years casu-
alties from exposure to harmful pollutants will keep lawyers busier than products liability
cases. Quade, Pollution Boom, 69 A.B.A. J. 149 (1983). Furthermore, the United States De-
partment of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency term the illegal disposal of haz-
ardous waste the " 'most serious environmental problem of the day.' " EPA, Justice Exploring
Methods to Reach Illegal Waste Disposers, 10 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1275 (1979), which quotes
United States Department of Justice attorney Barry Trilling at a meeting of the Federal Bar
Association on September 28, 1979.
The strong public awareness of environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s has not
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ness, Congress' and all of the states5 have passed legislation that regulates
weakened in the 1980s. A March 1985 Harris poll found that environmental clean-up is more
important to Americans than economic growth, by a 63% to 33% margin. Address by Louis
Harris, Chairman, Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Wildlife Management Institute (Mar. 18,
1985).
4. Significant federal environmental legislation includes: the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1152 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) (now a part of RCRA, infra); National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (this
act, which announced a national policy of productive and responsible use of the environment,
began the recent proliferation of environmental legislation); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 &
Supp. 11I 1985) (provides regulation of hazardous waste aimed primarily at providing funds
through license fees to clean-up hazardous waste sites); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. II1 1985) (provides financial and tech-
nical resources to dispose solid and hazardous waste in a manner which will result in the least
harm to the environment); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6911 (1976) (re-
placed by RCRA in 1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 &
Supp. 111 1985) (provides for increased control of toxic substances); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987) (provides for
increased regulation of water contaminants); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (aimed at controlling pollution caused by
pesticides used in agriculture); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1802 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (increases the standards regulating the transportation of hazard-
ous materials); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (provides air
pollution control standards); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982) (aimed at
promoting marine technology research).
5. Every state regulates hazardous waste by statute. ALA. CODE §§ 22-30-1 to -30-24
(1984 & Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.60.010-.105 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
49-901 to -905, 49-921 to -928, 49-941 to -944 (Supp. 1986); ARK. CODE OF 1987 ANN. §§ 8-
7-101 to -518 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249, 25280-25299, 25300-
25395, 25500-25570, 25600-25611 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13271,
14080 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-101 to -313, 25-16-101 to -201
(1982 & Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-114 to -1340 (West 1985 & Supp.
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6319 (1983 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
403.721-.771 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-60 to -113, 50-9-80 to -84
(1982 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 340A-1 to -3 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4400 to
-4432 (1985 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , paras. 1001-1051 (Smith-Hurd 1984
& Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-8.5-1 to -10, 13-7-8.6-1 to -15, 13-7-8.7-1 to -6, 13-
7-13-1 to -4, 13-7-10-1 to -5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.411-.490
(West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3430 to -3490 (1985 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 224.855-.877 (Baldwin 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1131-:ll50,
32:1501-:1520 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1317-1371, 1401-1404
(1978 & Supp. 1987); MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-201 to -268 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21C, §§ 1-30, ch. 21D, §§ 1-19, ch. 21E, §§ 1-15, ch. 94B, §§ 1-10 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.501-.551, 299.601-.611, 299.701-.706 (West
1984 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.01-.921, 115B.01-.37, 116.101, 116.11-.12
(West 1987 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-1 to -135 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 260.350-.609 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-401 to -421
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1521.01 to .07 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 459.400-
.770 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-A:l to :20, 147-B:l to :A1,
147-C:1 to :7, 147-D:l to :6 (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-1 to -176, 2C:17-2,
2C:43-3 to -4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-1 to -13 (1987); N.Y.
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disposal of various wastes, including hazardous waste,6 and provides civil
penalties,7 injunctions, 8 administrative remedies, 9 and criminal sanctions1"
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0101 to -1321, 37-0101 to -0109, 71-2701 to -2727, 71-3703,
72-0401 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-290 to -310 (1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-20.3-01 to -10, 32-03-41 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3734.01 to .99 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 230.1-.16, tit. 63, §§ 1-2011 to -
2021 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 466.005-.995 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 6018.101-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.1-1 to -36 (1985 &
Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -510 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-I 1-I to -23 (1986 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-46-
101 to -221 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV, STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 to -7f (Vernon 1976 & Supp.
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-14-1 to -25, 26-14a-I to -9, 26-14b-1 to -21 (1984 & Supp.
1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6601-6618 (1984 & Supp. 1987); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§§ 1551-1564 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-270 to -312 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.105.005-.900, 70.105A.010-.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5E-1 to
-23 (1985 & Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.60-.797 (West Supp. 1987); WYO, STAT.
§§ 35-11-101 to 35-12-902 (1987).
6. CERCLA defines a hazardous substance as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602
of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed
pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not
including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. 6901-6987 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollu-
tant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as
a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic
gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982).
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment conservatively states that currently
one billion tons of hazardous waste are produced each year. U.S. Congress, Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, From Pollution to Prevention: A Progress Report on Waste Reduction -
Special Report OTA-ITE-347 19 (1987). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS
WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED
1 (1979). United States Environmental Protection Agency officials believe that 90% of hazard-
ous waste is disposed of in an environmentally unsound manner. UNITED STATES ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECriON AGENCY, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE 15 (1980).
7. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1982); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1982).
CERCLA § 9609 provides a penalty up to $25,000 for various violations, such as failure of a
person in charge of a vessel to notify the National Response Center established under the
Clean Water Act when a hazardous substance has been released in violation of § 9602; RCRA
§ 6928(g) provides a penalty up to $25,000 for each violation of any of the provisions of the
hazardous waste management subchapter. See also infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1982);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(e) (1982).
9. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2618(e) (1982).
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when the regulations are violated. Protection of the environment is the gen-
eral purpose of this legislation."
10. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1982). This section provides for a fine up
to $250,000 for a felony or a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of human life; up to $25,000
for a misdeamenor; and up to $1,000 for an infraction. Id. See also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (1982). Under § 6928(d), a person who knowingly makes a false statement on any
required report or permit is subject to a fine up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to one
year.
11. The main purpose of environmental regulation is to conserve the environment. Spe-
cifically, New York states that the purpose of its Environmental Conservation Law is "to con-
serve, improve and protect its [the state's] natural resources and environment and control
water, land and air pollutions in order to enhance the health, safety and welfare of the people
of the state and their overall economic and social well being." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §
1-0101 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988). Examples of other purposes include FWPCA, 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1987), which is aimed at federal, state, and local
cooperation to conserve water and related land resources, and NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370a (1982 & Supp. 11 1985), which is aimed at productive yet responsible use of the
environment.
The purpose of Illinois' Environmental Protection Act is "to restore, protect and enhance
the quality of the environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are
fully considered and borne by those who cause them." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111 , para.
1002(b) (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987). Maryland states the purpose of its environmental
legislation to be "for the protection of the public health and safety." MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN.
§ 7-102(a) (1987).
Examples of statutory purposes behind hazardous waste regulation include New Jersey's:
[D]isposal and utilization of solid waste [including hazardous waste] is a matter of grave
concern to all citizens and is an activity thoroughly affected with the public interest; that
the health, safety and welfare of the people of this State require efficient and reasonable
solid waste collection and disposal service or efficient utilization of such waste.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-2a (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). In addition, Pennsylvania states that:
"improper and inadequate solid waste practices create public health hazards, environmental
pollution and economic loss, it is the purpose of this act to . . . accomplish . . . an effective
solid waste management program." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.102 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
In addition, State of New York Executive Chamber Memorandum Filed with Senate Bill
Number 4345-B (July 26, 1986) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Legislation] (this
Memorandum is unpublished and on file with New York Senator Hugh T. Farley), and State
of New York Department of Law Memorandum for the Governor (July 9, 1986) (submitted
by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, this Memorandum is unpub-
lished and on file with New York Senator Hugh T. Farley) state that criminal sanctions for
those who unlawfully dump hazardous waste are seldomly utilized, and that it is the legislative
intent to deter future violations by easing the availability of criminal sanctions. See also supra
note 6.
Thus, while the purpose of environmental regulation is to conserve the environment, crimi-
nal punishment of violators is provided to further that purpose. The primary goal of enforcing
criminal penalties of environmental regulations is deterrence. M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR 206, 209 (1979). See also Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corpo-
rate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REV. 61, 63 (1972) (explores the
criminal responsibility of corporate officials and the difficulties in prosecuting officers who vio-
late environmental regulations); D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 17; UNIF. LAW COMMISSION-
ERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3, 10 U.L.A. 47 (1985); Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra; Memorandum for the Governor, supra at 3; W. LAFAVE & A.
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Many of the environmental statutes provide both civil and criminal
penalties; 2 however, courts impose civil penalties more frequently than
criminal penalties when both are available.1 3 Unfortunately, the civil penal-
ties have not effectively reduced violations of environmental statutes.1
4
SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 36 (1986); F. CULLEN, W. MAAKESTAD & G.
CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND (1987)
(this book analyzes the movement against white collar crime and the evolution of corporate
criminal liability).
12. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1982); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6906, 6928 (1982).
See also Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2613(d), 2615 (1982); FWPCA, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1319 (1986 & Supp. 1987); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7618(e) (1982);
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1809 (1982). See also, e.g., N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988) amended by
1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 671 §§ 13-21 [hereinafter ch. 671]; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112, para.
1002 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987); MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-203 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:IE-50 (West Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.102 (Purdon Supp.
1987).
This note does not address the issue of whether a fine or incarceration is the most effective
criminal sanction, if indeed either is more optimal. This note advocates the use of criminal
sanctions, fines, and/or imprisonment, rather than the use of civil penalties. For arguments
covering the fine/incarceration debate, see Kutcher, The White-Collar Criminal: Probation
Conditions of Community Service and Charitable Contributions, 45 FED. PROB. 61 (Sep.
1981) (argues for creative probation conditions to ensure effective punishment of white-collar
criminals). Kutcher states that: "[fQines are rarely large enough to deter similar criminal of-
fenses. The individual or the corporation may view a criminal fine as only 'a price of doing
business.' Fines are particularly inadequate punishment for corporate criminals." Id. See also
Posner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980)
(arguing that fines are a better deterrent than incarceration); Braithwaite, The Limits of
Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Conduct, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 481 (1982)
(arguing that economic fines are the most effective means of encouraging responsible corporate
conduct); Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics
of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419 (1980) (arguing that incarceration provides
the optimal deterrent to potential corporate criminals); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
WHITE-COLLAR JUSTICE: A BNA SPECIAL REPORT ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1976). A fed-
eral judge has stated: " '[m]y experience at the bar was that one jail sentence was worth 100
consent decrees and that fines are meaningless because the defendant in the end is always
reimbursed by the proceeds of his wrongdoing or by his company down the line.'" Id. at 14.
Legislation that requires a fine equal to twice the amount of the defendants' gain, and does not
allow indemnification of the convicted officer by this corporation addresses the judge's
concerns.
13. See infra notes 62-69, 174-88 and accompanying text. See also State of New York
Governor's Program Bill, Attorney General's Program Bill, 1985-1986 Memorandum 3 [here-
inafter Memorandum] (this Memorandum is unpublished and on file with New York Senator
Hugh T. Farley); Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 40, 50 (1978) (analyzes policy considerations of selecting criminal sanctions for
illegal corporate behavior); Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11; Comment,
Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants
Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 93, 102 (1985). This lack of
criminal convictions has been described as an "enforcement gap" by one commentator. D.
REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8. See also Comment, supra note 11.
14. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8; Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really
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Meanwhile, prominent authorities stress that deterrence is the main pur-
pose of criminal penalties. 5 Thus, in an effort to prevent future violations,
legislatures have toughened criminal sanctions. 6 Before prosecutors may
concentrate on seeking a criminal sanction, however, they are faced with a
procedural concern.
After discovery of a violation of an environmental statute, the prosecu-
tor will have to determine who should be punished. Many violators of envi-
ronmental statutes are corporations, which may be punished according to
the explicit language of most statutes.' 7 An obvious question, however, is
whether punishment of a corporation, which in many instances is comprised
of hundreds or thousands of employees and hundreds or thousands of share-
holders, will accomplish the goals of punishment, especially deterrence. 8
Common sense dictates that it will not.' 9 Therefore, to punish violations of
environmental statutes adequately, responsible corporate officers must be
punished.20
Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 924 (1975); Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34
N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 94 (1959); Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
15. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, § 1.5, at 36. See also Corporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1235
(1979) (analyzes recent increased reliance of the federal government on the deterrent effect of
criminal punishment to shape corporate activities); UNIF. LAW COMMISSIONERS MODEL SEN-
TENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, supra note 11.
16. See ch. 671, supra note 12; supra note 11.
17. See, e.g., ch. 671, supra note 12; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , para. 1003(i) (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987).
Corporate environmental crimes cause harm to more than just the environment, including
humans: "[wihite collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust; this lowers the social
morale and produces social disorganization. Many of the white collar crimes attack the funda-
mental principles of the American institutions." M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE
AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPO-
RARY SOCIETY 174 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 13
(1949)).
18. See supra note 15.
19. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 148 1955); E. SUTH-
ERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 54 (1983).
20. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 45 (1957) (argues
that the best deterrent of corporate crime is direct employee liability), See also Comment,
Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide, Has the Fiction Been Extended Too Far?, 4 J.L.
& COMM. 95 (1984) (argues that the conviction of corporate officers will deter and punish
corporate crimes more effectively than punishment of the corporate entity); Comment, Limits
on Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 604 (1984) (analyzes
the recent trend of imposing greater individual accountability for corporate crimes and argues
that individual accountability should be expanded); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 32 (1972) (stating that criminal jurisprudence requires that guilt involve
personal fault); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 579-80, 155 A.2d 825, 827 (1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960) (upholding the conviction of an employer for acts committed
by his employees without personal knowledge, participation, or presence of the employer). In
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the corporate president had received a letter from
[Vol. 22
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the FDA concerning unsanitary conditions at the corporate warehouse, but did not attempt to
alleviate the conditions. The Court stated that there is a duty of those who exercise authority
and supervision in corporations to seek out and remedy violations and to implement measures
to avoid violations, and that breach of this duty can result in criminal liability. Id. But cf. R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225, 226 (1976) (Posner argues that if
the corporate fine is appropriate, it will cause corporations to police the misconduct of their
executives). Posner's argument does not consider the wealth available to many corporations to
pay fines, as opposed to the resources of a corporate officer, even if the officer's salary is large.
Also, when corporations are fined the fines are small in relation to the corporate assets and the
savings which unlawful acts many times provide. See infra notes 182-84, 189-92 and accompa-
nying text.
Conviction of corporate officers for environmental violations is rare. M. CLINARD, supra
note 11, at 207. Indeed, juries have convicted corporations while acquitting the responsible
corporate officers. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) (affirming the conviction of the General Motors Corporation for
conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce). This is an absurd result because the
corporate officers, and not the corporate entity, made the unlawful decision. Id.
See also the following which address the issue of criminal sanctions for corporate violators
of environmental statutes: Comment, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV., supra note 13 (arguing
that federal environmental statutes should include minimum levels of criminal fines and should
focus on responsible individuals within corporations); McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental
Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 1133 (1986) (examines the recent increase of federal government attention toward the
use of criminal sanctions for enforcing environmental laws, and aims at giving corporations,
individuals, and counsel an understanding of criminal actions in the environmental area); Al-
lan, Criminal Sanctions Under Federal and State Environmental Statutes, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q.
117 (1987) (a guide to, research tool for, and listing of publications covering the burgeoning
area of environmental crime); Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 379 (1986) (analyzes criminal sanctions under federal environmental statutes); Envi-
ronmental Crimes in White-Collar Crime: Third Annual Survey, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373
(1984) (reviews and interprets criminal sanctions available under federal environmental stat-
utes); Comment, supra note I1; Comment, Criminal Enforcement of Federal Water Pollution
Law in an Era of Deregulation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 642 (1982) (suggests an
approach to prevent the degradation of the nation's waterways, which emphasizes stiffer crimi-
nal penalties for more effective deterrence); Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and
Corporate Criminal Liability for Water Pollution, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 576 (1980) (ana-
lyzes the trend toward increased criminal prosecution of water pollution crimes); Braithwaite,
supra note 12.
For discussions of criminal liability of corporate officers in general, see Emerson, The
Director as Corporate Legal Monitor: Environmental Legislation and Pandora's Box, 15 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 593 (1985) (examines the potential liability of the outside corporate direc-
tor as a consequence of federal environmental legislation); Irenas & Moskowitz, Indemnifica-
tion of Corporation Officers, Agents, and Directors: Statutory Mandates and Policy
Limitations, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117 (1984) (examines statutory indemnification of con-
victed corporate officers by corporations); Comment, supra note 14 (arguing that imputing
acts of an agent to the corporation would serve to deter the criminal behavior of corporate
agents).
Many authors have discussed the civil liability provided in hazardous waste statutes. See,
e.g., Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste Inju-
ries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117 (1980) (examines the common law and statutory remedies of those
damaged by hazardous waste); Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to En-
vironmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN.
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Federal statutes regulating hazardous waste21 provide minimum stan-
dards and penalties, specifically authorizing the individual states to create
stricter regulatory standards and penalties as they see fit.2 2 In accordance,
many states, including New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois,2" have followed Congress' lead. New York is one state that
provides criminal penalties against corporations and corporate officers for
prohibited disposal of hazardous waste.2 4 Recently, New York amended
several sections of that legislation.2 5 This amendment focuses on reinforcing
the criminal sanctions which may be imposed on corporate violators.2 6 The
amendment, however, fails to provide a statutory structure likely to accom-
plish the explicit legislative goal of deterrence, and thus effectively protect
the environment.27
This note will focus primarily on the recent New York hazardous
waste amendment. The note will begin, in section II, with discussion of the
choice between civil and criminal penalties for use on convicted offenders.
Section III will examine federal legislation and the response of the federal
courts to the legislation. Section IV will then examine the responses of five
states, beginning with New York's progressive version. The examination
will continue with the responses of Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois to the authority, given to them by Congress, to enact hazardous
waste regulations that are stricter than those passed by Congress. These
states have embraced the congressional authority and have developed addi-
tional hazardous waste regulations. Next, the responses of several of these
states' judiciaries to their respective state legislation is analyzed. Section V
will then analyze the prosecutorial problems that have hindered the imposi-
L. REV. 575 (1982) (arguing that traditional tort recovery does not adequately compensate
toxic waste victims and that therefore a new compensation scheme is needed); Mott, Liability
for Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 379
(1982) (discusses the legal basis for imposing liability on generators of hazardous waste and
owners and operators of disposal sites).
21. See supra note 4.
22. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949
(1982).
23. See, e.g., ch. 671, supra note 12; infra notes 75-104 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 75-104.
25. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1988) amended by ch. 671 (1986).
26. Ch. 671, supra note 12.
Consumer advocate and general watchdog Ralph Nader claims that corporate crimes
cause injuries to people on a larger scale than street crimes and that more people are killed by
corporate criminal activities than by individual homicides, stating that "even if death is an
indirect result the person still died." M. CLINARD, supra note 11, at XVL. Air pollution causes
an estimated 140,000 deaths annually. R. CRAMER, CORPORATE CRIMINALITY IN CORPORA-
TIONS AS CRIMINALS 20 (1984).
27. Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11, at 3; see also Memorandum in Sup-
port of Legislation, supra note II.
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tion of criminal sanctions. Finally, section VI proposes a model state statute
that incorporates New York's recent chapter 671 amendment and statutory
provisions from several states into the New York hazardous waste statutory
structure with additional statutory provisions from several other states. This
further refinement of the New York hazardous waste amendment would
increase the use of criminal sanctions on corporate officers who violate envi-
ronmental statutes. The refinement would also help fulfill the legislative
purpose of environmental protection and would provide a model for other
states to follow in their respective battles against hazardous waste pollution.
II. CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PENALTIES: WHICH WILL FULFILL THE PURPOSE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION?
Our society believes that certain acts are morally wrong and require
punishment." This punishment can be either a civil penalty or a criminal
penalty. While environmental legislation provides both civil and criminal
penalties for use against regulatory violators,2 9 civil penalties have been
used far more frequently than criminal penalties.30 Several reasons account
for the lack of criminal prosecutions,"1 and this note proposes legislation
that would help increase the use of criminal sanctions.3 2 Criminal punish-
ment satisfies six goals of society: prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, edu-
cation, retribution, and deterrence." Criminal penalties also carry a com-
munity stigma and a criminal record. The main purpose of criminal
sanctions, however, is deterrence.-4 Civil penalties, on the other hand, are
aimed at compensating the victims. 3
5
With conservation of the environment as the main purpose of environ-
mental legislation, 6 and civil penalties the main sanction utilized by the
courts, 37 violations have continued despite the legislation." Civil penalties
28. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 11, § 1.5, at 30.
29. See supra notes 7, 10 and accompanying text.
30. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note I1; see also supra note 13; infra
notes 62-69, 174-88 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 201-33 and accompanying text.
32. See text accompanying notes 234-50.
33. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note II, § 1.5, at 31-36.
34. Id. at 36. See also supra note 15. Criminal penalties have the potential of instilling
more of a feeling of guilt in the violator's mind, due to the stigma attached to criminal convic-
tions. Criminal penalties may also include imprisonment of the violator. Imprisonment carries
an obvious deterrent because freedom of movement is considered an important right inherent
in our society. Loss of such an important right is considered a significant loss imposed only for
serious violations of society's norms and mores.
35. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958).
36. See supra note I1.
37. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11; see also infra notes 62-69,
174-88 and accompanying text.
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are obviously not deterring violators of environmental statutes;39 deterrence
of violators is needed to reduce future violations. New York has concluded
that potential future violators of hazardous waste regulations must be de-
terred, and thus, criminal sanctions must be utilized more frequently
against violators.4 0 Thus, if violations of hazardous waste regulations will be
reduced in the future, potential violators must be deterred. Adequate deter-
rence is not provided by civil penalties, but is provided only from the use of
criminal penalties.
III. THE FEDERAL SCHEME
A. The Federal Acts
Congress first addressed the problems created by the unregulated dis-
posal of wastes in 1899 with passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act."' This
Act prohibited the discharge or deposit of any refuse, except refuse from
streets or sewers, into any navigable waterway. 42 The next significant fed-
eral act regulating waste disposal was the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 43 This Act defined hazardous waste and pro-
vided civil and criminal penalties for improper discharge of hazardous
38. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11; see also infra notes 62-69,
174-88 and accompanying text; D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8.
39. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note I1, § 1.5, at 33-34. See also Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, supra note 15; UNIF.
LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, supra note I]; supra
note 20.
Two authors recently concluded that based on the experiences of enforcement agencies in
the last decade, criminal enforcement actions provided by environmental statutes have a
greater deterrent effect than civil sanctions. They add that the greater monetary sanctions and
negative publicity of criminal sanctions provide powerful deterrence. McMurry & Ramsey,
supra note 20, at 1157-58. McMurry and Ramsey also argue that if the corporate officer faces
a real possibility of criminal prosecution offenders will be prompted to divulge information
more readily, in hopes of mitigating penalties, and thus help the enforcement agencies with
limited investigatory budgets. Id. at 1150. The environmental statutes encourage this aid to
enforcement by protecting employees from firing or economic reprimand by the corporation.
See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982); FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. §
1367 (1986); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1982); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 1609 (1982); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982).
The U.S. Department of Justice also believes that enforcement pressure on individuals
greatly increases the deterrent effect of environmental statutes. McMurry & Ramsey, supra
note 20, at 1162.
40. Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11, at 3; see also Memorandum in Sup-
port of Legislation, supra note 11; ch. 671, supra note 12.
41. Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (enacted to reduce
discharges of materials, which hindered navigation, into the nation's waterways).
42. Id.
43. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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waste." An important provision of RCRA grants individual states the
power to devise a remedial plan with penalties stricter than those provided
by RCRA.' 5
Soon after the enactment of RCRA, Congress passed the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980
(CERCLA).4'6 The focus of this legislation was the clean-up of existing
dangerous hazardous waste sites.47 To accomplish that end, CERCLA pro-
vides criminal fines and/or imprisonment. However, the act limits criminal
liability to the falsification of records filed with the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,' and the failure to comply with the acts determined necessary
by the Attorney General of the United States to prevent a threatened dis-
charge of wastes. 49 Thus, CERCLA basically utilizes civil remedies aimed
at cleaning up hazardous waste with little concern for the criminal liability
of the culpable parties. Congress gave the states the authority to eliminate
this deficiency in federal legislation by enacting their own criminal
sanctions.50
Congress further addressed the problems of hazardous waste manage-
ment by passing the Toxic Substances Control Act,5 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)'5 2 the Clean Air Act,53 and other similar
acts." The Toxic Substances Control Act and the Clean Air Act provide
criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations, while the FWPCA
provides criminal sanctions for negligent, knowing, knowing endangerment,
and false statement violations.55 An important provision found only in the
44. Id. §§ 6921, 6928.
45. Id. §§ 6941-6949. Indeed, the primary purpose of RCRA is to provide technical and
financial assistance to states in an attempt to encourage them to develop comprehensive solid
waste disposal plans.
46. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. II1 1985).
47. See Id.
48. Id. § 9603(d)(2).
49. id. § 9606(b).
50. See supra note 22.
51. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
52. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
53. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982 & Supp. Ii 1985).
54. See also the following related legislation: NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 &
Supp. 1ii 1985); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. 1401-1445 (1982); Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1360-1364 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1802 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
55. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l)(b) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982); FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (Supp. 1987). The criminal
sanctions may be imposed for violation of permit limitations or conditions under the FWPCA,
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1); for violations of emissions standards under the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1); and for refusing inspections, for refusing to establish and allow access to
records; and for using prohibited chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2615. In addition, up to six months imprisonment (two years under the FWPCA)
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FWPCA is a minimum monetary fine of at least $2,500 per day of viola-
tion.56 This minimum fine shows an intent of Congress to ensure the imposi-
tion of a more than nominal punishment on those who unlawfully discharge
wastes into waterways. 57 A final provision of the federal statutes that at-
tempts to regulate hazardous waste is application of the criminal sanctions
to any "person." 58 Congress demonstrated with this explicit language that it
intended to allow for criminal punishment of corporate officers who could
otherwise hide behind the corporate veil.59
and a fine of $10,000 may be levied for falsifying required records and documents and for
tampering with monitoring devices under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2), and the
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(4).
This is a bright spot in the federal sanctions. A $25,000 per day fine (maximum available)
would undoubtedly be a significant sum to many corporate officers. However, courts tend to
impose light sentences. See infra notes 62-69, 174-88 and accompanying text. Therefore, these
fines should include minimum levels, such as the FWPCA provides. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. §
1319(c)(1) (Supp. 1987). See also infra note 57.
56. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1310(c)(1) (Supp. 1987).
57. Inclusion of a minimum fine in the FWPCA increased the likelihood that the con-
victed offender will be penalized; a $2,500 fine will carry more of a sting than a $100 fine.
While inclusion of minimal fines will not always guarantee that a penalty is felt, because the
minimum fine levied on a corporate officer earning a six figure salary will not amount to much
of a penalty, it is a more potent penalty than $100, regardless of the convicted individual's
assets. Congress should have included minimum fines and minimum prison terms in other envi-
ronmental statutes to increase the penal affect of the sanctions. However, by granting this
power to the states, Congress has transferred the responsibility to the states.
State legislation which includes minimum fines and minimum prison terms should also
include, to effectively penalize violations and deter future violations, explicit language which
orders the judge to consider the assets of the corporate officer before sentencing. Thus, corpo-
rate officers with large salaries should be given larger fines.
58. See, e.g., FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3) (Supp. 1987); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982).
59. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a judicial remedy whereby the distinc-
tion between the corporate entity and its shareholders is eliminated so that the shareholders,
which usually include the corporate officers, may be held individually liable for acts done
under the corporate name. The corporate veil may be pierced in occurrences of fraud, disre-
gard of corporate requirements, undercapitalization, and where fairness requires utilization of
the doctrine. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976) (disregard of the corporate requirements). See also Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18
N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (undercapitalization); Bartle v. Home
Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955) (fraud); Anderson v. Abbott, 321
U.S. 349, 365 (1944) (noting that a corporation may not be used to defeat a legislative policy,
whether this is the aim or merely the result of the corporate entity); Town of Brookline v.
Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (lst Cir. 1981) (the corporate arrangement was disregarded when
a shareholder was enabled to circumvent a federal statute, due to his limited liability); Capital
Tel. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (piercing of the corporate veil "in the inter-
ests of public convenience, fairness and equity").
An example of the insulatory belief which many corporate officers function under is pro-
vided by a Harvard Business Review study which found that four of five executives questioned
believed that at least some accepted practices in their industries were unethical. Baumhart,
How Ethical are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REv. 160 (1961). In addition, four of seven
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1988], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss2/5
1988] CORPORATE OFFICER LIABILITY
In conclusion, not all federal statutes that regulate hazardous waste
attach criminal liability for unlawful disposal of hazardous waste. Those
statutes that provide criminal sanctions usually provide no other relief. Only
one of the statutes providing criminal sanctions provides minimum fines. 60
The other statutes would benefit from inclusion of minimum fines and mini-
mum prison terms because of the higher loss they may force convicted vio-
lators to suffer. This inclusion would improve the deterrent value of the
regulations. While most of the statutes suffer from deficiencies, Congress
provided for the elimination of the deficiencies by allowing state legislatures
to enact stricter standards and penalties than the federal statutes provide.6
While Congress has therefore laid a foundation for hazardous waste regula-
tion, it has left the responsibility of building an effective statutory structure
upon the individual states.
B. The Federal Courts' Response to Legislative Acts
Courts have been reluctant to impose criminal sanctions on corpora-
tions and their officers who unlawfully discard hazardous waste.6 2 Few fed-
eral cases have resulted in such sanctions. Such scarcity of precedent hin-
ders prosecutors and courts in an attempt to punish corporate officers.
However, some precedent for conviction does exist. In United States v.
thought that other executives would violate a code of ethics if they knew they would escape
detection by authorities. Id. at 19.
Both the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3) (Supp. 1987), and the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982), for example, provide: "[flor the purposes of this subsection [re-
ferring to criminal penalties], the term 'person' shall mean . . . any responsible corporate
officer."
By piercing the corporate veil, courts are able to levy the penalty on the responsible indi-
vidual. This deters other corporate officers because they certainly do not relish the thought of
imprisonment or a personal fine. It may be argued that penalizing the corporation will still
penalize the responsible officer because his cohorts will chastise him (impose some type of
penalty, possibly release him of his duties, or cause loss of respect within the corporation).
However, when the corporation is penalized innocent parties suffer, especially shareholders and
innocent employees; see supra note 19. Furthermore, a penalty levied by the corporation
against the responsible officer is not guaranteed. Thus, piercing the corporate veil penalizes the
source of the violation, avoids penalizing innocent parties, and provides deterrence in the effort
to protect the environment.
60. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1) (Supp. 1987).
61. See supra note 22.
62. Punishment of individuals involved in corporate crimes of any type has been very
uncommon; for example, the number of criminal antitrust cases filed in all U.S. District
Courts between 1960-1981 averaged 24 per year. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS - 1982 at 486 (1983). See also
supra note 20. But cf. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1906). In MacAndrews, the corporate presidents of two corporations were held criminally re-
sponsible for their activities in violating the Sherman Act by setting prices for the 85% of the
market in licorice pastel (an essential ingredient in plug and smoking tobaccos, as well as
cigars and snuff) that the two corporations enjoyed. Id. at 825.
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Frezzo Brothers, Inc.,63 the Third Circuit affirmed the maximum fine of
$50,000, given by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, on the corporation and $25,000 on each of the two responsible corpo-
rate officers, along with mild jail sentences of thirty days.64 In Frezzo
Brothers, the defendants had willfully discharged manure from their mush-
room farm into a creek on four occasions. Unfortunately, courts have not
followed, but have ignored, the Third Circuit's attitude toward corporate
pollution. The norm in federal courts is for the corporate defendants to face
63. 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1979). In another area of
public health regulation, the Supreme Court upheld a criminal negligence conviction of a cor-
porate president for allowing unsanitary conditions to exist in a food warehouse. United States
v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (also see the discussion of Park at supra note 20).
64. 602 F.2d at 1124. A further example is provided by United States v. Distler, Crim.
No. 77-00108-01-L (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
827 (1981). In Distler, Distler, the principal owner of a corporation which dumped toxic
chemicals into a sewage system, was sentenced to two years imprisonment and given a $50,000
fine under the FWPCA. Judgment and Commitment Order, United States v. Distler, Crim.
No. 77-00108-01-L (W.D. Ky. 1979). However, the United States government spent over $1.5
million in cleaning up the chemicals, and 161 citizens were treated for exposure to the toxic
chemicals. United States v. Distler, Crim. No. 77-00108-01-L (W.D. Ky. 1979) (Transcript of
Sentencing at 9). Penalties such as Distler's are likely to provide more deterrence to future
potential violators than a much lighter sentence.
See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987), where the court upheld the District Court for
the Western District of Missouri's holding of a supervisor of a chemical manufacturing plant
personally liable under RCRA and CERCLA for having arranged for the illegal transporta-
tion and disposal of hazardous waste. The court ruled that a company employee who had the
authority to handle the disposal of hazardous waste is personally liable for any illegal disposal
of the waste. Id.
A further bright spot in federal prosecution is seen in Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872
(1987). In Chesapeake Bay, the court said that the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia did not abuse its discretion by assessing a penalty of $1,285,322 for violation of
monthly average and daily limits for pollution discharges. The court discarded the argument
that this penalty is greater than those assessed for similar violations five or more years earlier.
Id.
See also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985), where the EPA tried to criminally prosecute, under RCRA, a
truck repair company and two of its employees who were seen illegally dumping toxic chemi-
cals into a trench. The court reversed the District Court for the District of New Jersey and
held the employees strictly liable under RCRA's knowing violation standard. The EPA could
not convict the employees in this case, however, because the court held that each defendant
would have to know that the corporation was required to have a permit, and these employees
did not know that their corporation did not possess a permit. Id.
See also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 649 F. Supp. 347 (D.D.C. 1986), where a chemical waste processing facility that had
violated RCRA regulations for over a year and a half was fined $40,000. The district court
observed that the company could have been fined over $30 million and that the $40,000 civil
fine was possibly too lenient. Id. The D.C. District Court here has shown that it will likely
impose stiff sentences in future cases.
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meaningless sentences.' 6
The decisions of the majority of the cases will not likely affect the way
in which potential violators act. Corporate violators will regard these deci-
sions as only slight hindrances to actions that violate environmental stat-
utes. When criminal sanctions are available, the courts should impose them
to a degree which assures a penalty that is more than a slap on the wrist.66
Courts should follow the lead provided by Frezzo Brothers7 to accom-
plish the statutory goals, especially the goal of deterrence.6 8 To punish cor-
porate environmental statute violations, courts must be willing to punish the
source of the crime, the corporate officer who makes the decision or has the
duty to see that the corporation follows environmental regulations.69
65. 602 F.2d at 1130. See United States v. Blue Lagoon Marine, Inc., No. 75-80824
(E.D. Mich. 1975), where a corporate agent deliberately turned on a pump, discharging hun-
dreds of gallons of gas onto a frozen lake. The agent was given the minimum fine allowed
under the FWPCA, $2,500, and the corporation was acquitted. Id.
Further, in United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978),
a suspended sentence was given the defendant even though it had knowingly submitted repeat-
edly false statements on required periodic reports. The district court merely ordered the de-
fendant to bring its sewer system up to statutory standards. Id. at 9.
Additionally, in United States v. Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d
133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985), the defendant had been discharging refuse
into a creek for over a year, and had been storing thousands of drums of highly toxic chemicals
on the creek's banks, in violation of criminal provisions of the River and Harbors Act. The
court affirmed the District Court for the Northern District of New York's imposition of liabil-
ity on the president and vice-president of the four-shareholder corporation under civil provi-
sions of the Act, but not its criminal provisions. Id. at 134. The court acknowledged the appli-
cation of criminal sanctions but did not utilize them. Id.
If the courts do not utilize criminal sanctions in cases such as these, and impose the lowest
fine available for an act as blatant as willfully discharging hundreds of gallons of gas onto a
frozen lake, the deterrence of future violators is very low at best. Criminal sanctions which
punish statutory violations, and severely punish blatant, willful statutory violations must be
imposed to deter as many future violators as possible.
66. A fine of $1,000 imposed on the president of a large corporation will not serve as a
penalty in light of the high salary such an individual earns. The assets of the defendant must
be considered to provide appropriate penalties.
67. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1979).
68. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 11, § 1.5, at 31-36; Comment, supra note 14,
at 924 (arguing that imputing acts of an agent to the corporation would serve to deter the
criminal behavior of corporate agents). Gilbert Geis argues that corporate officers believe that
personal liability for corporate crimes is a very effective deterrent. Geis also argues that corpo-
rate officers fear jail and feel deep shame when sent there. Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corpo-
rate Criminals, 8 CRIm. L. BULL. 377, 378-80 (1972). See also Comment, supra note 14, at
911.
69. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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IV. STATE RESPONSES TO THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THEM BY CONGRESS
A. State Legislation
While hazardous waste is a national concern, it has a strong impact at
the local level. For example, areas such as Love Canal have given New
Yorkers, and indeed the nation, a vivid example of the repercussions of un-
regulated disposal of hazardous waste. 0 In August 1978, the Love Canal
area was declared a disaster area when chemical waste, stored thirty years
earlier, seeped out of its containers and into the ground water.y In response
to such occurrences, provisions in federal statutes delegating authority to
the individual states, 2 and heightened public concern, 3 many states have
enacted legislation attempting to clean-up present hazardous waste sites
and to deter dumping in the future.7 4
70. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36, col. 3.
71. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corporation dumped chemical wastes in a landfill in
the 1940s. In 1953 Hooker gave the land to a school board, and subsequently a school and
homes were built around the burial site. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1979, at 36, col. 3. Leakage of
the chemicals up to the surface of the ground in 1978 caused the relocation of over 200 fami-
lies. Love Canal Cleanup in Progress; Federal Funding Still Pending, State Says, 9 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1780 (1978). A further example of the local impact of unregulated hazardous
waste dumps include the derailment of a freight train carrying toxic chemicals near Sturgeon,
Missouri. Weingarten, A Tiny Town Cries Foul, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 22, 1979, at I, col. 2. Also,
the effects of dumping PCB-laced oil-waste chemicals along roads in North Carolina had a
strong impact on local residents. North Carolina Officials Seek Source of Intentional PCBs
Highway Spill, 9 Env't Rep. (BNA) 662 (1978).
72. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6944-6949
(1982).
73. See supra note I and accompanying text.
74. See Staff of § 301(E) Study Group (printed for the use of the Senate Committee on
Environmental and Public Works) 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries and Damages from Hazard-
ous Wastes - Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies Part I, at 83 (Comm. Print
1982) Part 2, at 131; see also supra note II.
Under the traditional penal model, the principal goal of punishment is rehabilitation, thus
many judges believe prison terms provide little benefit, that the disgrace of a conviction itself
will rehabilitate the corporate officer. However, the primary purpose of penal sanctions for
corporate executives is believed by many to be deterrence. See also supra note 15; Mann,
Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479 (1980).
It is observed that imprisonment is considered too harsh for nonviolent white-collar criminals,
a view fostered by many judges who believe that a corporate officer has been sufficiently pun-
ished when facing a sentencing hearing, due to loss of reputation and career. Thus, it is argued
that greater deterrence will be achieved only through increased prosecution of white-collar
criminals. Id. at 482-87, 491-92, 496-98.
Other states which highly regulate hazardous waste are: California, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249, 25280-25299, 25300-25395, 25500-25570, 25600-25611 (West
1984 & Supp. 1988); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13271, 14080 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); Colo-
rado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-101 to -313, 25-16-101 to -201 (1982 & Supp. 1986); Indi-
ana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-8.5-1 to -10, 13-7-8.6-1 to -15, 13-7-8.7-1 to -6, 13-7-13-1 to -4,
13-7-10-1 to -5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.01-.921,
115B.01-.37, 116.101, 116.11-.12 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
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For example, New York has devised a comprehensive environmental
regulatory framework designed to attack environmental abuse." The
framework has grown steadily. The legislature continues to lengthen and
amend the Environmental Protection Law."8 However, chapter 671, New
York's most recent amendment to its Environmental Conservation Law,
though incorporating important changes to the Environmental Conservation
Law, has not eliminated the need for further acts and amendments to effec-
tively regulate hazardous waste. 77
1. New York's Statutory Structure
The New York legislature has determined that the criminal prosecu-
tion of those corporate officials responsible for discarding hazardous waste
into the environment in manners unacceptable to the public has not oc-
curred to the extent desired by the public.78 As a result, on July 26, 1986,
the New York legislature passed chapter 671.79 This legislation amends the
criminal sanctions for those who unlawfully discard hazardous waste.80
Many times authorities do not criminally prosecute the corporate of-
§§ 459.400-700 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); and Oregon, OR, REV. STAT. §§ 466.005-.995
(1987).
75. New York enacted its environmental regulatory structure, the Environmental Con-
servation Law, Chapter 43-48 of the Consolidated Laws of N.Y. (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1988) in 1972. The purpose of the law is "to conserve, improve and protect its [the state's]
natural resources and environment and control water, land and air pollution, in order to en-
hance the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state and their overall economic and
social well being." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
Several of the major acts within the Environmental Conservation Law are: Air Pollution Con-
trol Act, id. §§ 19-0101 to -0711 (to safeguard the air resources of the state from pollution);
State Acid Deposition Control Act, id. §§ 19-0901 to -0923 (to establish an acid deposition
control program for emission within the state); Liquefied Natural and Petroleum Gas Act, id.
§§ 23-1701 to -1727 (siting of liquefied natural and petroleum gas facilities to control the
hazards posed by liquefied natural and petroleum gas storage and transportation); Freshwater
Wetlands Act, id. §§ 24-0101 to -1305 (to preserve, protect and conserve freshwater wetlands
and the benefits which they provide); Tidal Wetlands Act, id. §§ 25-0101 to -0601 (to preserve
and protect tidal wetlands with consideration of the state's reasonable economic and social
development as well).
76. Fourteen new articles were added between 1972 and 1984. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
77. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
78. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 3, states that the New York courts have been un-
willing to impose criminal sanctions and that the limited definitions of hazardous waste have
kept prosecutors from seeking criminal sanctions.
79. See supra note 12. The purpose of this amendment, as stated by Robert Abrams,
Attorney General of the State of New York, in Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11,
at 1, is to "facilitate and increase statewide prosecutions of environmental polluters by ex-
panding the scope of existing crimes, closing procedural loopholes and increasing penalties."
80. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
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ficer who authorizes the unlawful release of hazardous waste.81 To ease the
prosecution of corporate officers section 37-0107 of the Environmental Con-
servation Law has been amended. This section which previously limited the
liability to "industrial or commercial user," now extends the liability to any
"person" who unlawfully stores or releases any regulated substances. 2 This
amendment should ease the prosecutor's dilemma of who to name as de-
fendant, and will allow for the implication of many corporate officers in-
stead of corporations.
Further areas amended by chapter 671 are the definitions of criminal
classifications and corresponding penalties. 8 An extremely important pen-
alty is a fine equal to double the amount of the offender's gain.8" This sanc-
tion amounts to a penalty because the offender will experience a net finan-
cial loss.
Chapter 671 was also enacted to extend the statute of limitations for
prosecuting violations. 85 The legislature increased the statute of limitations
for bringing an action against an offender from two to four years after the
unlawful act has been discovered. 8 Thus, the corporate officer may no
longer escape liability as easily as he could under the previous statute of
limitations. However, a four-year limitation is unsatisfactory because of the
length of time required to locate some violators.
The case of State v. Schnectady Chemicals, Inc.,87 exhibits the prob-
lem posed by a four-year statute of limitations. In Schnectady Chemicals,
the New York county court found that a nuisance action was the only rem-
edy for damage caused by chemical waste dumped unlawfully between fif-
81. See supra note 13.
82. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 37-0101,
-0103, -0105, -0107 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)). It is easier to indict a responsible
corporate officer under the language "person" than "industrial or commercial user." Industrial
or commercial user indicates the corporation is the target more than any individual.
83. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 13 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2707, -
2709, -2715, -2717 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)). Ch. 671 reduces the amounts of re-
leased hazardous waste which constitute various reckless misdemeanor and felony violations, as
well as increases the penalties for knowing violations and strict liability violations.
There are many changes adopted by ch. 671, supra note 12, § 13, with a general increase
of the degree of penalty from the previous language.
84. However, if the offender gains a small amount, for example if $100 is saved by the
violation, a fine of double the amount of the offender's gain will not result in much of a
penalty.
85. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 2.
86. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 25 (amended N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1988)).
87. 117 Misc. 2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, affid as modified, 103 A.D.2d 33, 479
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984) (gradual migration of chemical wastes from inactive site into surface
and ground water).
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teen and thirty years before its discovery.88 While the increase of New
York's statute of limitations will certainly aid prosecutors, elimination of
the statute of limitations would give prosecutors adequate time to pursue
violators whose crimes are not discovered for many years. In Schnectady
Chemicals,89 elimination of the statute of limitations would have allowed
conviction of the responsible individuals.90
The previous narrow definition of hazardous waste was another hin-
drance to vigorous and effective criminal prosecution of environmental stat-
ute violations.9' Previously, in many instances prosecutors had been unable
to categorize very dangerous substances as hazardous waste,92 and violators
were cited for or subject to civil violations only.93 The New York legislature
does not believe that civil penalties are sufficient penalties.9 Thus, an im-
portant change adopted by chapter 671 is the broadening of the statute's
wording from disposal of "wastes" to "substances." This increases the scope
of activities that are subject to criminal conviction. 5 Further, the "dispo-
sal" of regulated substances was replaced by the word "release" to facili-
tate conviction of those who discard unauthorized substances into the envi-
ronment.96 Thus, a corporate defendant will be unable to declare that the
discarded material was only a "substance" and not a "waste," even though
it is a harmful substance. Also, he or she will not be able to circumvent
liability by declaring that the substance was only "released" and not
"disposed."
Chapter 671 changes the definition of hazardous waste in another use-
ful manner. The definition provides three newly added technical gradations
88. Id. at 964, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 976. A successful nuisance action would not provide the
conviction and deterrence desired by the New York legislature. Memorandum for the Gover-
nor, supra note II, at 3; see also Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
89. State v. Schnectady Chems., Inc., 117 Misc. 2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, affid as
modified, 103 A.D.2d 33, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984).
90. Elimination of the statute of limitations would have allowed conviction, and thus
deterrence, which are explicit legislative purposes. See Memorandum for the Governor, supra
note II, at 3; see also Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
91. Memorandum, supra note 13. The Memorandum states that "[e]nforcement of the
ECL [Environmental Conservation Law] . . . has been frustrated by the narrowness of the
definition of a hazardous waste." The Memorandum also states that "[tihis bill will expand
the scope of existing law to allow prosecution of conduct which causes or contributes to the
release to the environment of all hazardous substances . Id. at 2.
92. Memorandum, supra note 13, at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The legislative intent of ch. 671, supra note 12, is provided by Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra note I1, at 1, which states, "[iun the past, prosecutors have been
frustrated in the prosecution of conduct which resulted in a release where the substance re-
leased was very dangerous but not, as a technical matter, a hazardous waste."
96. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 37-0101, -
0103, -0105, -0107 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
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of toxicity, making identification of hazardous substances easier for prose-
cutors and corporate officers. 97 Furthermore, section 37-0103 now autho-
rizes the Department of Environmental Conservation to promulgate a list of
substances that are hazardous or acutely hazardous to public health, safety,
or the environment based on new specific guidelines. This list provides
added specificity to the definition of hazardous waste. 98 Despite the more
specific definition of hazardous waste, complaints from the business commu-
nity have still been common.99
Before passage, an argument against enactment of chapter 671 was
that it failed to define prohibited acts with the specificity necessary to direct
business activities.100 This argument is misguided. Chapter 671 provides
new, specific definitions of regulated substances, and also provides extensive
guidelines for the Department of Environmental Conservation to utilize in
promulgating a list of substances within two years of the chapter's effective
date.10 1 Chapter 671 also lowers the amount of possession of hazardous and
97. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0101 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986) read
"'[S]ubstances hazardous to the environment' shall mean substances which, because of their
toxicity, magnification or concentration within biological chains, present a demonstrated threat
to biologic life cycles when discharged into the environment." Id. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9,
amended § 37-0101 to read as follows:
1. "Oral LD (rat) toxicity" means a calculated dose of a substance which is expected to
cause the death of fifty percent of an experimental rat population when administered
orally.
2. "Inhalation LC (rat) toxicity" means a calculated concentration of substance in air,
exposure to which is expected to cause death of fifty percent of an experimental rat popu-
lation when inhaled.
3. "Dermal LD (rabbit) toxicity" means a calculated dose of a substance which is ex-
pected to cause the death of fifty percent of an experimental rabbit population when
applied to the skin.
Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0101 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1986)).
98. The guidelines include the definitions found supra note 97 and the definitions found
in the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (1982); the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1982); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9631
(1982).
A further change of ch. 671 is prohibition of the "storage or release" of substances haz-
ardous or acutely hazardous to public health, safety, or the environment. The previous lan-
guage was "storage or discharge" of such substances. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0107 (McKinney 1984'& Supp. 1988)).
99. Letter from Raymond T. Schuler, representing the Business Council of New York
State, addressed to the Honorable Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor (July 1, 1986) (this
letter opposed enactment of ch. 671 on the grounds of failing to protect businesses with per-
mits, a failure to define "discharge" and "release," incomplete definitions of oral LD (rat)
toxicity, inhalation LC (rat) toxicity and dermal LD (rabbit) toxicity, and lack of a need for
the bill).
100. Id.
101. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0103
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
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acutely hazardous waste constituting presumptive evidence of a violation."'
This lowering also caused concern among the business community. 0 3 Chap-
ter 671, however, provides an absolute defense to this presumption to those
who possess a valid permit, license, or certificate. 1'0 Therefore, the New
York legislature has addressed the problems that businesses previously en-
countered when they attempted to determine whether disposal or release of
their waste would be lawful.
2. The Potential Success of Chapter 671
By enacting chapter 671 the New York legislature intended to facili-
tate criminal prosecution of those corporations, corporate officers, and other
individuals who discharge hazardous waste in an unlawful manner. 1 5 The
amendment provides a specific definition of hazardous waste and specific
criminal sanctions. The definition and sanctions are intended to aid prosecu-
tors and the courts in convicting the type of offender who has traditionally
been given mild civil penalties. 0 6 Yet, the amendment does not contain the
provisions needed to fulfill the legislative intent.10
Examination of case law exhibits the dearth of criminal convictions of
corporations and corporate officers responsible for unlawfully discarding
hazardous waste.'0 8 Applying chapter 671 to cases decided before its enact-
ment tests its effectiveness. This application attempts to see whether the
cases would result in different outcomes today, in light of the intent behind
the amendment.
For example, a limiting problem that courts encountered with the pre-
vious statutory provisions was the lack of proper notice as to what consti-
tutes a hazardous waste. In People v. Attco Metals Industries, Inc.,'0 9 the
New York county court held that the definition of hazardous waste pro-
vided in the Environmental Conservation Law would not let corporate of-
102. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 16 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2719
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)). This will facilitate prosecution of responsible corporate of-
ficers when the corporation continually discards waste and leaves little evidence of a violation
on the corporate premises.
103. See supra note 99.
104. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 17 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-
2720(1),(2) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)). A corporation and corporate officer operating
under a valid permit issued by a New York state agency, the federal government, or an order
from the Commissioner of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency cannot be convicted.
105. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text; see infra notes 174-88 and accom-
panying text.
109. 122 Misc. 2d 689, 471 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1984).
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ficers decide whether their activity would violate the regulations. 10 This
vague definition would present an obvious obstacle to the prosecution of
corporate officers. If the definition of hazardous waste is vague, a corporate
officer can only make a good faith judgment. If legislatures regulate haz-
ardous waste, they have a duty to give an adequate definition of hazardous
waste; chapter 671 does provide a specific definition." Also, chapter 671
provides specific guidelines for the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion to utilize in promulgating a new list of hazardous waste in addition to
incorporating definitions provided in the federal acts.' 12 The definition and
list should provide clear definitions and examples of hazardous waste which
will help prosecutors determine whether a violator released an unlawful
material.
Chapter 671 provides further that criminal liability involving reckless,
knowing, or strictly liable releases of hazardous waste constitutes a fel-
ony."' In Haz-O-Waste Corp. v. R.M. Williams,"4 a New York Appellate
Division court confirmed substantial evidence of the illegal storage, on two
separate occasions, of cyanide waste by the defendant after the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation specifically informed the de-
fendant not to store the waste illegally. With proof that the corporation's
president had knowledge of the violations, the appellate court merely ap-
proved a $10,000 civil penalty levied on the corporation by the Department
of Environmental Conservation."' Chapter 671 provides the mechanism for
imposing a criminal sentence on the president of Haz-O-Waste Corpora-
tion. Section 15 of chapter 671 provides a class C felony conviction when
any person intentionally releases a substance he or she knows will create a
substantial risk of physical injury to others." 6 Illegal storage of cyanide
creates a substantial risk of physical injury to another person."' Thus, a
class C felony could have been imposed on Haz-O-Waste's president.
Van de Mark Chemical Co., Inc. v. Williams,"8 provides a further
example of the potential success of chapter 671. In Van de Mark, a New
York Appellate Division court confirmed the New York Department of En-
110. Id. at 693, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
111. See supra note 84.
112. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 9 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0105
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
113. Ch. 671, supra note 12, §§ 13, 15 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-
2707, -2709, -2711 to -2714, -2715, -2717 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
114. 103 A.D.2d 1001, 478 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1984).
115. Id. at 1001, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
116. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 15 (adds a new § 71-2714 to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
117. Cyanide is defined as an "extremely poisonous . . . solid." THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1297 (vol. II 1970).
118. 107 A.D.2d 1046, 486 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1985).
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vironmental Conservation's finding of a violation of section 19-0107(3) of
the Environmental Conservation Law, and other violations, but only af-
firmed a $2,500 civil penalty." 9 Here several sections of chapter 671's crim-
inal sanctions could have been utilized, had they been available.' 20 In addi-
tion, in D.V.C. Industries, Inc., v. Flacke,'21 where D.V.C. violated its
discharge permit on at least eighteen separate instances by releasing haz-
ardous waste into ground water, the Appellate Division court confirmed the
Department of Environmental Conservation's imposition of an $18,000 civil
penalty,'2 2 or less than $1,000 per violation. Under chapter 671, the corpo-
ration and the corporate officer would have been subject to a class D felony
for knowing release of a hazardous substance into a primary water
supply. 2
3
Chapter 671 provides the specific definition of hazardous waste and
stiffer criminal sanctions that should ease the prosecutor's burden of proof
when attempting to convict those corporate officers or individuals who vio-
late regulation of hazardous waste releases. More importantly, the New
York legislature has given the message to prosecutors, judges and juries
that they have not prosecuted corporate polluters at an acceptable level.
Other states should follow this lead and thereby increase their laws' deter-
rent effects. However, the provisions of chapter 671 do not provide prosecu-
tors and the courts with the arsenal needed to convict the unlawful corpo-
rate officer effectively.12 4 Other states provide this weaponry through
statutory structures that can be borrowed in order to punish violators effec-
tively and deter potential future violations.
3. Other State Legislative Responses
The statutory structures addressing hazardous waste crime in such
heavily populated and industrialized states as Maryland, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, and Illinois offer further examples of legislative attempts to curtail
119. Id. at 1047, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
120. Ch. 671, supra note 12, §§ 9, 13-16 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 37-
0101, -0103, -0105, -0107, 71-2707, -2709, -2715, -2717, -2719 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1988), and added new §§ 71-2710 to -2714 to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-
0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
121. 86 A.D.2d 892, 447 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1982).
122. Id.
123. Generally, ch. 671 should facilitate conviction of corporate officers who unlawfully
discharge hazardous waste because the quantities of discharged waste which constitute the
various levels of liability have been lowered, and the amount of hazardous waste which consti-
tutes presumptive evidence of knowledge of violation has been lowered. Ch. 671, supra note
12, §§ 13-16 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-2707, -2709, -2715, -2717, -2719
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988), and added new §§ 71-2710 to -2714 to N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERv. LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
124. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
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unlawful releases of hazardous waste by imposing criminal sanctions. These
states have chosen to provide extensive regulation of hazardous waste and
offer some of the nation's most progressive regulation of hazardous waste.125
While each state has provisions to add to an effective statutory scheme,
each state has its deficiencies. 126
Maryland's Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Substances Act is a
state statute that provides some interesting provisions . 2 7 This Act, which
defines hazardous waste broadly,' 28 includes several unusual features.' 29 For
example, Maryland provides fines up to $100,000 and imprisonment up to
five years for violation of the Act. Moreover, since 1982, the legislature has
removed the statute of limitations for felonious storage, disposal, and trans-
portation of hazardous substances. 8 0 The removal of the statute of limita-
tions aids prosecution greatly because in many cases the evidence of illegal
action is discovered many years after the illegal activity occurred.' 3' Elimi-
nation of any statute of limitations would allow prosecutors to bring crimi-
nal suits against the violator whose concealed waste was not discovered for
a number of years,' 3 2 or in cases where discovering the violator requires
years of searching. Thus, an effective statutory scheme would not include a
statute of limitations, thus allowing for prosecution both of violations dis-
covered years after the fact and of violators found years after the violation.
Despite its favorable provisions, Maryland's statutory structure has de-
ficiencies which contribute to the state's "enforcement gap.' 3 3 For exam-
ple, Maryland does not contain a specific hazardous waste definition,13 4
minimum fines and prison terms, a penalty of double the amount of the
offender's gain, or mandatory criminal sanctions. Also, Maryland does not
include the following: (1) forbiddance of indemnification of convicted cor-
porate officers by their corporations; (2) the deprivation of corporate man-
agement positions for the convicted officer for at least two years; (3) the
language which encourages piercing the subsidiary corporate veil; (4) the
125. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 13-17 (all states but Illinois are discussed). See also
states cited supra note 74.
126. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8 (all states but Illinois are discussed).
127. MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7 (1987) (known by popular name as Controlled Haz-
ardous Substance Act). D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 14.
128. MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-201(m) (1987).
129. While not directly related to criminality, the Act requires transporters of hazardous
waste to give a bond or security for abatement of any pollution resulting from improper trans-
port of a hazardous substance. Also, three certificates, a hauler, a vehicle, and a driver certifi-
cate are required of transporters, along with documents and labels concerning the hazardous
substance being transported. Id. § 7-249.
130. Id.
131. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 15.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 8.
134. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
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restitution of injured parties; and (5) the pre-emption of local sewer regula-
tions.135 These measures would increase Maryland's ability to close its "en-
forcement gap," which would deter future potential violators,"'6 and thus
fulfill the legislative purpose of protecting the environment. 137
Unlike other states, New Jersey's regulations threaten corporations
with the forfeiture of business practices in the state. New Jersey's hazard-
ous waste criminal statutory structure'8 8 provides for fines up to $100,000
and imprisonment up to ten years for individuals, and fines up to $300,000
for corporations.' 39 Also, several sentencing alternatives in New Jersey in-
clude: fines equal to twice the monetary gain to the offender or twice the
monetary damage caused by the offense;1 40 restitution by the offender in the
amount of damage resulting from the crime; " corporation dissolution; 42
charter forfeiture;14 3 and prohibition of future business interests in New
Jersey.4 14 These alternatives are very useful deterrents'4 5 which show a leg-
islative concern for the corporate polluter problem.
Restitution by the offender in the amount of damage is a provision
which a successful criminal legislative scheme should include. 4  This would
135. See infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 15.
137. See supra note 11.
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:17-2, 2C:43-3 to -4, 13:]E-9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
New Jersey's statutory structure was not fully developed until 1979. Prior to 1979, actual
harm or damage from a discharge was required for criminal liability. This requirement was
abandoned in 1979, along with the change of the crime of nuisance to the concept of illegal
release or abandonment. Id. § 2C:17-2.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 2C:43-3(e) (this provision would guarantee the imposition of a penalty be-
cause future potential violators will not consider a violation beneficial if conviction would result
in a loss of twice the gain).
141. Id. § 2C:43-3(f) (restitution not only requires that the offender would lose any gain
from the offense, and thus be penalized, but it serves to compensate the victim as well).
142. Id. § 2C:43-4(b). Any dedicated corporate officer would be deterred by the possibil-
ity of corporate dissolution because this would eliminate his source of income; many corporate
officers have some pride in their corporation, which would be lost. Telephone interview with
Chris L. Warning, Financial Analyst with Commonwealth Edison Co., Chicago, I1l. (Mar. 7,
1987).
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-4(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). A corporate charter is
a constitution of a corporation which gives it the legal right to exist and function. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, without a charter the corporation is dissolved and
the corporate officer has lost his job.
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-4(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). This provision provides
more deterrence than corporate dissolution and charter forfeiture because unlike these two
penalties, prohibition of future business activity in the state will not let the corporate officer,
who has just lost his job due to dissolution of his corporation, quickly charter the identical
corporation under a new name.
145. See supra notes 140-44.
146. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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require the corporate officer him/herself to compensate the injured party,
which would obviously deter future offenders more than if restitution is not
required, or if the corporation provides the funds.1" It would also eliminate
the harm created by the unlawful conduct.
New Jersey's statutory scheme, while providing some useful ideas to-
wards effective legislation, does not include key provisions for effective reg-
ulation of hazardous waste. For example, the statute should give a specific
definition of hazardous waste.1 48 The legislation, however, should contain
further provisions.14 9 These measures would increase the likelihood that
New Jersey will close its "enforcement gap" in the future,15 0 deter potential
future violators, 51 and thus fulfill the purpose of the state's environmental
legislation, protection of the environment. 152
Another state with extensive hazardous waste regulation is Pennsylva-
nia. Pennsylvania has a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act
which includes a broad definition of hazardous waste.' 53 The penalties in
the Pennsylvania act provide for minimum as well as maximum levels for
fines and imprisonment terms.1 5 These minimum levels provide the courts
with penalties that are likely to be significant and thus will have a greater
deterrent effect on others. Finally, Pennsylvania has a twenty-year statute
of limitations that does not begin to run until the offense is discovered.'55
This recently enacted statute of limitations will undoubtedly help prosecu-
tors greatly.1 5 6 In many cases, illegal dumpings escape discovery for years
and require extensive investigation after discovery and before prosecutors
147. Restitution by the convicted corporate officer to the injured party, which should
include the state and the public costs (thus, clean up of hazardous waste would be included) in
the amount of the damage, would most importantly attempt to alleviate the harm which
brought about the need for a penalty. If no person (including the public) or thing (the environ-
ment) were harmed, there would be no reason for a penalty. Additionally, restitution will re-
quire a substantial cash flow from the convicted individual, and this would result in a penalty
because the offender would rather not part with the required cash. However, whether restitu-
tion amounts to a penalty would rest on the facts of each case (depending especially on the
assets of the convicted corporate officer).
148. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
150. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8.
151. See supra note 15.
152. See supra note 11.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.101-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (the hazardous
waste definition is given at § 6018.103).
154. Id. § 6018.606(g). For example, the highest penalty, first degree felony, carries a
fine of at least $10,000 but not more than $500,000 per day of violation, and imprisonment for
between 2 and 20 years. Id.
155. Id. § 6018.617.
156. However, to prove entirely effective at convicting responsible parties who are diffi-
cult to locate when the crime has been discovered, the statute of limitations should be
eliminated.
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may seek criminal prosecution.' 57 Effective environmental legislation should
not have a statute of limitations because violators whose crime has been
concealed for many years should be subject to prosecution. 58 Further, in-
clusion of minimum fines and prison terms in a statutory scheme would not
guarantee that every corporate officer would consider all imposed criminal
sanctions punishment, but the legislation would increase the likelihood that
the violator will indeed suffer a penalty.'59
Pennsylvania provides several provisions which facilitate conviction of
the corporate officer who has violated environmental regulations. However,
several provisions which would facilitate conviction are missing.160 Inclusion
of these provisions would help close Pennsylvania's enforcement gap,' 6' de-
ter potential violators, 62 and thus fulfill the legislative intent of protecting
the environment. 163
Illinois also provides extensive hazardous waste regulation. The Illinois
Environmental Protection Act' provides for varying degrees of felony of-
fenses according to the offender's state of mind and the supposed severity of
the offender's action. Illinois does not use quantities of waste to determine
the degree of culpability. 65 Furthermore, the Illinois incarceration provi-
sions provide not only maximum sentences, but minimum sentences as
well.' 66 However, Illinois' criminal fines, which vary according to the of-
157. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 15.
158. Id. at 17.
159. A wealthy corporate officer convicted of an unlawful disposal of hazardous waste
which does not carry a minimum fine or a minimum incarceration period may receive a prison
term of five days and/or a $100 fine. However, if the same offense carried a minimum one
year prison term and minimum $2,500 fine, the likelihood that the corporate officer considers
the sanction as punishment will be greater.
160. See infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
161. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 8.
162. See supra note 15.
163. See supra note 11.
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , paras. 1003 to 1052 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987).
165. Id. ch. 111 , para. 1044. This avoids what at times seems unjust: unlawful release
of 4,999 gallons of a waste is treated as a lighter offense than the unlawful release of one
gallon of waste mixed with 4,999 gallons of water; or, the unlawful release of 4,999 gallons of
waste is treated as a lighter offense than the unlawful release of one more gallon (5,000 gal-
lons) of that waste. On the other hand, the absence of quantitative categories avoids the speci-
ficity which corporations find very important to decision-making. See supra note 99.
166. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987)
provides:
(4)for a Class I felony, the sentence shall be not less than 4 years and not more than
15 years;
(5)for a Class 2 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 3 years and not more than
7 years;
(6)for a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 2 years and not more than
5 years;
(7)for a Class 4 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 1 year and not more than
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fense, do not provide minimum dollar levels.' 7 Finally, Illinois provides a
lengthy definition of hazardous waste, but it is somewhat vague. 68 This
vagueness hinders the corporate officers' ability to determine what the legis-
lature considers hazardous waste. An effective statutory scheme should in-
corporate minimum prison terms for each class of felony similar to the Illi-
nois provision. 69 Illinois, however, does not offer any further provisions for
model legislation which will effectively result in imposition of criminal sanc-
tions on corporate officers.
While Illinois provides minimum prison terms that facilitate deterrence
of potential future violators,' 7 0 its Environmental Protection Act should in-
clude additional provisions.171 These measures would facilitate conviction of
corporate officers, which would deter future potential violators 7 2 and thus
fulfill the legislative intent of protecting the environment.' 73
As demonstrated by examination of various state approaches, varying
standards and penalties from state to state govern the imposition of crimi-
nal sanctions for unlawful release of hazardous waste. The examined states
are heavily industrialized and attempt to provide specific definitions of haz-
ardous waste and specific penalties for various levels of culpability which
are aimed at facilitating the conviction of offenders. New York, a state
which has experienced heavy industry over a longer period of time than
3 years.
167. Inclusion of a minimum term of years deters future potential violators because they
know that if convicted they face the possibility of at least one year in prison, opposed to 30
days or some other small period if the minimum levels did not exist. The language used by the
Illinois General Assembly is "subject to a fine not to exceed." See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1111/2, paras. 1042-1044(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987).
168. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , para. 1003.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) and supra
notes 97-98. Although lengthy, the definition retains an amount of ambiguity.
"Hazardous waste" means a waste, or combination of wastes, which because of its quan-
tity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or sig-
nificantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or dis-
posed of, or otherwise managed, and which has been identified, by characteristics or list-
ing, as hazardous pursuant to Section 3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, P.L. 94-580, or pursuant to Board regulations.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , para. 1003.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). The words "increase in
mortality" are ambiguous because it is difficult to determine an increase in mortality. The
main problem with this definition is lack of any concrete technical measurements that New
York now provides. See supra note 97. This was a problem New York had before ch. 671; the
definition was not specific enough for corporate officers to decide whether a regulation would
be violated.
169. See supra note 166.
170. Id.
171. See infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 15.
.173. See supra note 11.
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states such as Illinois, has addressed hazardous waste crime with a stronger
voice than Illinois. The current New York Environmental Conservation
Law provides a good lead toward furthering adequate regulation of hazard-
ous waste, but does not provide a framework which will successfully reach
this goal.
B. State Courts' Responses to the Legislation
State courts, showing the same unwillingness to utilize the criminal
provisions of environmental statutes as federal courts,"7 4 have sparsely im-
posed the increased criminal provisions of state environmental statutes. For
example, in D.V.C. Industries, Inc. v. Flacke,'7 5 a New York Appellate Di-
vision court found that D.V.C. violated its discharge permit on eighteen
separate occasions, including the failure to take action to correct eight vio-
lations after given ample time to do so. These violations resulted in a paltry
$18,000 civil penalty.' 8 This case provided an excellent opportunity for the
imposition of criminal sanctions against the responsible corporate officer.
These repeated violations show that the violator possessed the knowledge
required for imposition of a class D felony under chapter 671.177 Hence, a
criminal penalty, unlike a civil fine, in this situation would have provided
deterrence to officers of other corporations. 7 8
The decision in Haz-O-Waste Corp. v. Williams, is another instance of
the New York courts' reluctance to impose criminal sanctions. 9 In Haz-O-
Waste, a New York Appellate Division court found that the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation told the corporation on April
20, 1979, not to " 'accept, store, transport or dispose of any wastes signifi-
cantly contaminated with cyanides or cyanide compounds.' "180 However,
on June 4, 1979, and again on September 23, 1979, cyanide waste was
found stored on the premises. The Haz-O-Waste Corporation received only
a $10,000 civil penalty. To highlight the lack of fear which many violators
have towards prosecution, during each inspection the corporate president
pointed out numerous barrels of cyanide to the inspector. 8 '
Wasteland, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 82 provides an example of
174. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
175. 86 A.D.2d 892, 447 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1982).
176. Id. at 892, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
177. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 15 (adds a new § 71-2713 to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
178. See Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11, at 3; see also Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra note 11.
179. 103 A.D.2d 1001, 478 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1984).
180. Id. at 1001, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
181. Id.
182. 118 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 456 N.E.2d 964 (1983).
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judicial reluctance to impose criminal sanctions in the Illinois courts. In
Wasteland, the corporation violated, on nine separate occasions within one
year, a statutory provision that provides for criminal sanctions. The Illinois
appellate court affirmed the Illinois Pollution Control Board's finding that
the corporation committed the violations in bad faith and affirmed a
$75,000 civil penalty. This fine equalled only the amount that the corpora-
tion saved by utilizing unlawful, instead of lawful, practices.183 This penalty
fails to constitute a true penalty; the violator must experience a net loss of
something - money, freedom of movement, honor, status, etc. - for a
sentence to equal a penalty.184 Further, imposition of criminal,, as opposed
to civil, penalties would provide a stronger deterrent because of the stigma
attached to conviction and the problems created by a criminal record.'85
City of Moline v. Pollution Control Board,'88 provides another exam-
ple of the judicial reluctance in Illinois to impose criminal sanctions on vio-
lators of hazardous waste regulations. In City of Moline, the city violated a
provision of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, the city's permits,
and various administrative standards. The Illinois appellate court reversed
the Illinois Pollution Control Board's imposition of a penalty on the city
and stated that the Act's punitive measures are secondary considerations.1 87
This judicial interpretation is surely contrary to the legislative intent, given
the explicit inclusion of criminal penalties in the state's environmental
statutes.188
183. Id.
184. Penalty involves the idea of punishment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (5th ed.
1979). Punishment is "[a] deprivation of property or some right." Id. at 1110.
A fine which takes into account the offender's assets would constitute a financial penalty;
a prison term for a minimum of six months would provide a loss of freedom of movement. See
supra note 159 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 15.
186. 133 Ill. App. 3d 431, 478 N.E.2d 906 (1985).
187. Id. at 433, 478 N.E.2d at 908. See also Chicago Magnesium Casting Co. v. Pollu-
tion Control Bd., 22 II1. App. 3d 489, 317 N.E.2d 689 (1974), where a magnesium foundry
continued to violate sulfur dioxide emissions after investigation by a Pollution Control Board
investigator, but was not fined because emissions had discontinued by the time the complaint
was filed.
188. Illinois' criminal sanctions are similar to those provided in New York. See supra
note 83 (New York), and supra notes 165-67 (Illinois). The Illinois courts have not embraced
that state's environmental criminal sanctions. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text;
see infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. Likewise, the New York courts have not em-
braced New York's environmental criminal sanctions. See supra notes 174-81 and accompany-
ing text. The New York legislature has recently declared that criminal sanctions have not been
used at an acceptable rate. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 11. With the
similarities in the Illinois and New York criminal sanctions and judicial reluctance, the New
York legislature's recent statement that the criminal sanctions should be used more frequently,
and are thus not secondary considerations, surely applies to Illinois as well.
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Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 89 provides a
final example of the judicial reluctance to impose criminal sanctions for
hazardous waste violations in Illinois. In Standard Scrap Metal, a scrap
metal company was found to have knowingly operated a furnace and incin-
erator for nine years without a permit, and having failed to install an after-
burner to reduce furnace emissions to allowable rates.' 80 The Illinois appel-
late court affirmed the Illinois Pollution Control Board's $30,000 civil
penalty when the company's wrongdoings saved it over $100,000.' 1' Here,
the court should have imposed criminal sanctions on the responsible corpo-
rate officer. A penalty which at least equals the amount saved by utilizing
unlawful measures, or at least a prison term for the responsible individual
would provide a result more in tune with the notions of justice and
deterrence.192
Finally, a recent study of hazardous waste offense and offender charac-
teristics in Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania describes
many of the criminal penalties imposed against corporations and corporate
agents in these states between January 1, 1977, and December 31, 1984.118
The vast number of cases resulted in small fines and suspended prison terms
for individuals, and varied, usually small fines for corporations. 194 Obvi-
ously, the courts in these states are reluctant to impose criminal sanctions.
The failure of the state courts to impose criminal sanctions when con-
fronted with such blatant statutory violations as the offenders committed in
these cases exhibits the reluctance to impose criminal sanctions which per-
meates the judiciary.193 The purpose of the statutes that regulate disposal of
hazardous waste is to protect the environment.19 If the courts do not im-
pose criminal sanctions, illegal discarding of hazardous waste will not be
deterred, 197 clean-up funds' 98 will be grossly insufficient to handle the many
189. 142 Ill. App. 3d 655, 491 N.E.2d 1251 (1986).
190. Id. at 658, 491 N.E.2d at 1253.
191. Id. at 660-61, 491 N.E.2d at 1255.
192. In this case the company saved $100,000 and none of its officers suffered a penalty.
If the responsible officers were fined or penalized, the source of the evil would be penalized.
Also, a penalty would be felt; when the corporation is fined an amount which is less than it
saved by violating the regulations, it and other corporations might find this to be a wise busi-
ness practice because they came out ahead. Allowing a net gain to be realized when a penalty
is imposed is contrary to the purpose of penalties, which is that the recipient should suffer a
loss.
193. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 1.
194. Id. at 59-63.
195. See supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 11.
197. Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11, at 3; see also Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra note 1I.
198. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2723 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1988). See also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1982).
1988]
Warning: In Search of Effective Hazardous Waste Legislation:  Corporation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
416 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
unauthorized waste sites, 19" and the environment will undoubtedly suffer
from avoidable contamination. This absence of criminal sanctions will frus-
trate the purpose of protecting the environment. 00 While judicial reluc-
tance results in few criminal sanctions, judicial reluctance is not the only
reason why criminal sanctions are seldomly imposed.
V. THE PROSECUTION PROBLEM
While the scarcity of criminal sanctions levied against corporate of-
ficers who violate environmental statutes results in part from judicial reluc-
tance, prosecutorial problems also contribute to the scarcity of convictions.
First, the prosecutor must seek criminal sanctions before the courts can im-
pose them. Second, traditional public perceptions can hinder prosecutorial
and judicial efforts. Third, the corporate officer can attempt to insulate
himself within the corporate structure. Fourth, the corporate officer can at-
tempt to use the subsidiary corporation to escape liability. Finally, various
other special obstacles may hinder the successful prosecution of corporate
officers. Prosecutors and judges must attempt to avoid these obstacles when
possible.
A. Determination of Sanctions
After the prosecutor discovers a violation of an environmental statute,
he or she must determine whether to seek criminal sanctions. The determi-
nation of whether to pursue criminal penalties or civil monetary penalties is
left to the discretion of the officer or agency charged with enforcement.201
199. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 6, at 14.
200. See supra note II.
201. U.S. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). In Phelps Dodge,
where defendant's motion to dismiss criminal charges for polluting navigable waters was de-
nied, the court, in applying the FWPCA, concluded that the EPA Administrator must act on
any violation but that he has the choice of pursuing civil or criminal sanctions. Id.
In 1977, the statutory compliance deadlines for the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA ar-
rived, creating thousands of major source violations of statutory regulations. McMurry &
Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1135. (The FWPCA contained a July 1, 1977 deadline for attain-
ing emission levels to meet the best practicable technology (BPT) standards for industrial dis-
charges. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (1986). The Clean Air Act had similar deadlines for
air pollutants. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982)). Also, an activist administration ap-
pointed a new leadership in the EPA, the primary agency responsible for implementing most
federal environmental statutes. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1135. In addition,
congressional hearings on the reauthorization of the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA in 1976
and 1977 showed an impatience with the EPA's passive enforcement efforts. Id. In response,
the EPA adopted its Major Source Enforcement Effort (MSEE) to bring all major source
violators into compliance with the new Clean Air Act and FWPCA standards. Id. at 1136.
The aim was to bring as many enforcement actions as possible, which meant civil enforcement
actions because civil enforcement efforts are less costly than criminal enforcement efforts. Id.
Thus the EPA, in the late 1970s, focused on civil enforcement actions of environmental
[Vol. 22
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However, utilization of civil sanctions has not always fulfilled the purpose
of environmental regulations. 0 2 Therefore, prosecutors should be more will-
ing to seek criminal sanctions when they are available. 03 But once prosecu-
tors seek criminal sanctions, they must face judicial reluctance.2
B. Traditional Public Perceptions
The continued reluctance of the courts to impose criminal sanctions on
corporate officers for unlawful disposal of hazardous waste stems in part
from traditional views on this type of punishment.20 In the nineteenth and
continuing into the twentieth century, regulatory violations were considered
economic crimes. Accordingly, judges did not feel that economic crimes,
with the public as the victim, deserved criminal punishment.20 6 Secondly,
because the public perception of regulatory violations traditionally has been
a perception that regulatory violations were not morally delinquent acts, 207
violations have not been punished as criminal acts.2 0 8 In light of the recent
statutory violations. Moreover, the federal agencies directly responsible for criminal enforce-
ment of the environmental statutes, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, the
United States Attorney, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were not primarily con-
cerned with criminal enforcement actions. Thus, an organized federal criminal enforcement
program did not exist in the late 1970s. Id. at 1136-37.
The use of criminal enforcement has increased amongst some federal agencies in the
1980s. A new Environmental Enforcement Section of the Land and Natural Resources Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice was created in 1980 and listed criminal enforcement as its
top priority. J. TOMPKINS, JR., OFFICE OF POLICY & MGMT. ANALYSIS, CRIMINAL DIVISION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1980). Moreover, at the EPA a
new Office of Criminal Enforcement was created in 1981. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note
20, at 1140 (citing Office of Criminal Enforcement, Envtl. Protection Agency, Criminal En-
forcement Strategy 8 (Draft 1985)). In 1982 the EPA hired its first criminal investigators. Id.
These organizations, however, focused only on the most serious regulatory violators. McMurry
& Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1141 (citing B. Blum, Creation of the Office of Criminal En-
forcement 2-3 (unpublished EPA internal memorandum) (Jan. 5, 1981)). Nonetheless, EPA
claims that deterrence through criminal prosecution has become an important policy goal of its
enforcement activities. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1143. The EPA, state EPAs,
other prosecutors, and the judiciary will have to embrace this policy to fulfill statutory policies
of deterrence and thus compliance with statutory regulations. See ch. 671, supra note 12;
supra note 11.
Legislation that provides for mandatory criminal sanctions would eliminate the situation
in which criminal sanctions are available but are not sought. See supra note 11.
202. See supra note II.
203. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 62-69, 174-88 and accompanying text. See also Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra note 11; Comment, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV., supra note 13,
at 102.
205. Comment, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV., supra note 13, at 95.
206. Id.
207. 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.08, at 2-555 to -564 (1987).
208. Id.
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changes in public perception of environmental regulatory violations, 20 9 these
past obstacles should not permeate current judicial thought.
C. The Corporate Structure
Punishment of the individual functioning within the corporation for in-
volvement in corporate crime has been rare."' In a recent study, it was
found that in 1975 and 1976 only 1.5 percent of enforcement efforts against
corporate officers produced convictions.2 ' Furthermore, prison terms that
are levied rarely exceed thirty days, and fines are at a level generally con-
sidered inconsequential. 21' The corporate polluter thus faces only a slight
209. See supra notes 1, 3 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 62, at 526.
The corporate form of organization used in business has two advantages over other forms
of organization from the point of view of violations of law: 1) anonymity of persons which
impedes the location of responsibility; and 2) an increased rationality of the behavior con-
ducted under the corporate form. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 17, at 59.
211. M. CLINARD, supra note 11, at 206. M. Clinard sheds light on the amounts and
types of penalties which are actually served. In the study, of 56 federally convicted corporate
executives, 62.5% received probation, 21.4% had their sentences suspended and 28.6% were
incarcerated. The average prison sentence for all those convicted, whether or not they went to
prison and regardless of the offense, averaged 2.8 days; this was a total of 16 officers of 582
corporations sentenced to 597 days imprisonment. Finally, the average incarceration period for
the imprisoned corporate executive was 37.1 days. Id. at XXII. These figures certainly do not
amount to penalties, and their deterrent value is extremely low. A corporate officer aware of
the leniency which these figures represent will not be deterred.
212. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 17, at 233.
The minimal effect which criminal fines have on corporate defendants is illustrated by the
following. In 1976, 23 corporations were convicted of fixing and raising the prices of folding
cartons over a 30-year period. The corporations were initially fined $50,000 each, but some
fines were later reduced; nonetheless, $50,000 to these corporations was the equivalent of be-
tween $0.24 and $1.80 for persons earning $15,000 a year. Id. at 234. While jail sentences
may seem harsh for a corporate officer who unlawfully displaces hazardous waste, it is obvious
that corporations will continue to violate regulations if the penalties which are levied do not
affect corporate profits and result in protests from shareholders. Substantial fines and jail
sentences brought upon corporate officers will cause the nation's corporate officers to comply
with statutory regulations. Fines levied on corporate entities will many times be diluted
amongst shareholders and consumers, and thus any punitive and deterrent value will be nonex-
istent. See supra note 19.
The case of Allied Chemical is a good illustration of the point that even if the imposed
fines appear very extensive, they may not amount to what could be considered a penalty. Allied
Chemical, with over $2.6 billion in annual sales, organized a subsidiary corporation for pro-
duction of an insecticide which it knew was dangerous. Shortly after production began, 10 of
the employees became ill, as did people living near the plant. Soon, 100 miles of the James
River were closed to fishing for a period of time which resulted in a loss of between $4 million
and $24 million to the fishing industry. The EPA spent $3.5 million in clean up of the river.
However, not one individual of Allied was fined or faced a jail term, but the top two officers of
the subsidiary corporation were each fined $25,000 and placed on five years probation. Also,
the subsidiary corporation was fined $3.8 million, but was defunct so not one dollar of this fine
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chance of conviction, and if convicted a strong likelihood of a lenient
sentence.
The business judgment rule21 gives corporate officers' decisions defer-
ence to insure the risk-taking which stimulates economic vitality.2 1' While
providing corporate officers the needed security to make business decisions,
the business judgment rule does allow judicial review of business decisions
which are grossly negligent. 15 Thus, a strong corporate veil protects the
officers of corporations. 1 6 However, the environmental statutes provide reg-
ulations which do not allow the corporate violator to hide behind the corpo-
rate veil.2 17 Indeed, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is available to
prosecutors and courts when the corporation is used merely to isolate corpo-
rate agents from their wrongdoing, and allows conviction of corporate
agents despite the existence of the corporation.2 1 8 Prosecutors and courts
was ever paid. In addition, Allied Chemical was criminally fined $13.24 million. The final cash
outflow from Allied Chemical amounted to $9.5 million, which is $0.33 per share spread over
the 28,500,000 shares of Allied Chemical stock. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 17,
at 280-89. Allied stock averaged $45 per share that year. ALLIED CHEMICAL CO., 1982 AN-
NUAL REPORT (1983).
213. The business judgment rule states that corporate directors' decisions do not subject
the directors to personal liability for possible illegal results from their acts if they: I) acted
within the corporation's power and the directors' authority; 2) acted in accordance with a
reasonable basis for their decision; 3) acted in good faith and; 4) honestly believed that the
action was in the best interest of the corporation. The rule applies as well to corporate officers.
H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 508-09 (2d ed. 1986). In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, reh'g denied, 488 A.2d 898 (Del. 1985), the board of directors of a corporation agreed to
conduct a leveraged buy-out of another corporation controlled by a member of the board, after
a very short presentation and without virtually any investigation of the deal; the court found
that this was a violation of the business judgment rule.
214. H. HENN, supra note 213, at 508. See also Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Lia-
bility in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1368, 1378 (1948) (ar-
guing that industrial corporations should have broader liability); Landers, A Unified Approach
to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 617-19
(1975) (discusses problems posed by bankruptcy of subsidiary and affiliated corporations);
Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1967)
(discussing limited liability under two theories of corporate functions, the large corporation
and the small corporation); Comment, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder
Liability: The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 823, 830,
833-34 (1972) (arguing for less leniency on undercapitalized corporations).
215. See supra note 213.
216. See infra note 218.
217. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1982). See also supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
218. See also supra note 59. Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,
540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976) (the court pierced the corporate veil and held the corporation's
president personally liable for the debts of a corporation which completely disregarded corpo-
rate formalities, functioned only for the financial advantage of its president, and was under-
capitalized). On the other hand, corporate officers may utilize the ultra vires doctrine. This
doctrine states that any illegal act of a corporate employee which was done outside the scope
of employment does not impute liability to the employee's superiors for the wrongful conduct
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should fully embrace this doctrine to punish violators of criminal statutes.
D. Parent/Subsidiary Problem
A further obstacle to successful conviction of those responsible for the
illegal release of hazardous waste is the wholly-owned subsidiary of a par-
ent company. 19 This problem arises when the subsidiary functions primar-
ily as the discarder of waste and insulates the responsible individuals in the
parent corporation °.22  The environmental statutes have failed to address
this possible obstacle to prosecution of responsible individuals.21 The fail-
ure of environmental statutes to address the situation where a subsidiary
of the employee. Comment, supra note 11, at 65.
219. A parent company is defined as owning "more than 50 percent of the existing
shares of" another corporation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (5th ed. 1979).
See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages,
99 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1986) (discussing the failure of CERCLA to consider the situation
where the parent corporation has formed an insolvent subsidiary corporation which carries out
the wishes of the parent corporation while isolating the parent from liability for wrongful ac-
tions directed by the parent). See also M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 17, at 281.
Here, the bureaucratic and physical distance between the Allied Chemical officers and the
subsidiary shielded them, but not the subsidiary corporation, from liability. This problem
needs to be addressed in the environmental statutes. But cf. United States v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1964) where the district court held a corporation liable
for the activities of an employee of the corporation's subsidiary. Id.
220. Note, supra note 219. An example of this problem is City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The court said that the Pennsylvania Solid
Waste Management Act, which defines unlawful disposal of hazardous waste, requires that the
person who generated hazardous waste must dispose of it to be liable for unlawful disposal. Id.
at 1148-49. Therefore, a generator of hazardous waste may contract with a third party, which
may be its subsidiary, for disposal of the waste and not be liable for the disposal. When a
party contracts with another party to perform an unlawful act, both parties should be liable.
The court should have found the party which contracts for the unlawful disposal of its hazard-
ous waste liable. This would deter unlawful generators of hazardous waste from concealing the
true identity of their waste from unsuspecting disposers (such as those unlicensed to accept
hazardous waste, and thus unaware of the material's characterization as hazardous waste, who
would then bear the brunt of liability).
221. Note, supra note 219, at 987. But see United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) (the
court held that a person who owns an interest in a facility and is actively participating in its
management can be held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste; see the discussion of this
case at supra note 64). Further, courts have been willing to pierce the corporate veil when
there is evidence of a deliberate attempt to cut off liability by incorporating subsidiaries. See,
e.g., United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110, 119 (D. Vt. 1973), afd
mere., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (affirmed the granting
of equitable relief, for oil spills, from the principal owners of vessels engaged in transporting oil
for unreasonable interference with the public's rights). However, the doctrine has not been
utilized against subsidiary corporations under environmental statutes. Note, supra note 219, at
1001. Courts should not be so reluctant. Piercing the corporate veil of both the subsidiary and
parent corporations and convicting the responsible officers within the parent corporations
would put the penalty at its source. See also the Allied Chemical case, supra note 212.
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insulates individuals within the parent corporation who made illegal deci-
sions is a major deletion; it provides an excellent loophole for many corpora-
tions, and thus responsible corporate officers.22 An easy solution would be
explicit statutory language which calls for piercing of the subsidiary's cor-
porate veil to identify the responsible individual(s) within the parent corpo-
ration. The statute should read that the prosecutor could seek to pierce the
subsidiary's corporate veil whenever he or she has evidence that the subsidi-
ary corporation has functioned solely or primarily to insulate the parent
corporation from any liability for statutory violations.
E. Special Obstacles
In addition to the problems mentioned above, additional obstacles to
the prosecution of hazardous waste offenders exist. A recent study of haz-
ardous waste crime in four northeastern states has revealed seven special
obstacles.22s First, there are strong business community pressures to aban-
don prosecutions against corporations for unlawful releases of hazardous
waste.22 A second obstacle is the difficulty of adequately describing and
verifying dangerous levels of disposed hazardous waste to judges and ju-
rors.225 In addition, prosecutors are many times limited in the amount of
technical assistance at trial compared to the assistance corporate defend-
ants utilize.2 6 Also, many liberal local sewer disposal regulations conflict
with more stringent state regulations. 227 Furthermore, there are deficiencies
in tracking offenders which allow exploitation by offenders.228 Sixth, envi-
ronmental inspectors do not always collect evidence in a manner which en-
ables it to be used in a criminal prosecution. 229 Another obstacle is the push
for expediency in the criminal prosecution of cases and pressure put on
prosecutors by public and special interest groups.230
Two final obstacles prevent the successful prosecution of corporate of-
ficers. First, judges frequently accept nolo contendre pleas. 23' This judicial
222. The responsible corporate officer can organize a subsidiary, utilize unsuspecting
lower-level employees as corporate officers, and arrange for the subsidiary without suspicion or
without concern, to unlawfully discard hazardous waste.
223. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 4.
224. Id. Increased public awareness may erode this factor. Ch. 671's new definition of
hazardous waste will help eliminate this problem. See supra note 97.
225. D. REBovIcH, supra note 3, at 4.
226. Id. This factor can be hard to overcome when corporate coffers are very large.
227. Id. States should pre-empt local sewer regulations.
228. Elimination of any statute of limitations would prove helpful in tracking offenders.
See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
229. Education of inspectors would increase admissible evidence.
230. Education of the public would alert them to the intricacies involved, and time re-
quired, for successful prosecutions.
231. Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering Activities, 21
1988]
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acceptance virtually relieves the corporate officer from punishment because
a nolo contendre plea relieves the officer from subsequent civil liability,
which is imposed frequently. 3 2 Judicial acceptance of nolo contendre pleas
will not deter corporate officers because it gives them a sense that they have
done no wrong; that because their corporation indemnified them, the law
must not be right, or that the corporate officers' violation is somehow justi-
fied. Second, the corporation usually indemnifies its convicted corporate of-
ficer.2"' Thus, judges should avoid nolo contendre pleas and indemnification
to effectively deter future potential violators.
While courts may be reluctant to impose criminal sanctions when sanc-
tions are available, judicial reluctance does not fully explain the sparse use
of criminal sanctions against corporate officers who are responsible for un-
lawfully disposing hazardous waste. The problems mentioned above can
hinder the prosecutor's attempt to seek criminal sanctions before the judge's
role begins.
VI. A PROPOSAL TO ENSURE CORPORATE OFFICER CRIMINAL LIABILITY
None of the examined state statutes regulating hazardous waste singu-
larly accomplishes the intended protection of the environment from unlaw-
ful disposal of hazardous waste. 23 4 With the New York statutory structure
as the framework, the addition of chapter 671, several provisions from other
states, and further provisions, would provide a statutory framework which
would provide the best deterrent to unlawful disposal of hazardous waste
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 57 (1983) (analyzes corporate liability for injuries in the
workplace).
232. Id. If judges do not impose criminal sanctions that penalize, they should be more
reluctant in granting nolo contendre pleas.
233. Id. at 58; M. CLINARD, supra note 11, at 221.
All United States jurisdictions allow corporate indemnification of agents under certain
circumstances, by statute. Some of these include situations where an adverse judgment is lev-
ied against the agent, and some are even mandatory. Irenas & Moskowitz, supra note 20, at
117-18. The argument in favor of indemnification is that it encourages recruitment of capable
management. Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1978) (former
officer and director of a corporation was entitled to indemnification from corporation for legal
fees and expenses incurred in defending himself in securities actions after an aborted merger).
Also, it is argued that indemnification gives corporate officers discretion, void of any hindering
fear, in seeking profits. Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Di-
rectors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 1994 (1978) (analyzes indemnification and insuring
of directors and officers by their corporations for claims most likely to be encountered). How-
ever, protection of the nation's resources should not be inferior to the seeking of profits. Busi-
nesses need the resources to provide the products from which they seek to create profit. Deple-
tion of resources will deplete profits. Also, if corporate management is capable, it will be able
to make successful business decisions within the letter of the law. Legislators have not regu-
lated the use of resources to the point that profits may only be realized by unlawful practices.
234. See supra notes 75-104, 125-73 and accompanying text.
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and thus effectively protect the environment.
To further the deterrence of violations and protection of the environ-
ment, New York recently amended its environmental legislation, with the
enactment of chapter 671, in an attempt to facilitate conviction of violators
of hazardous waste statutes. Courts had been unwilling to embrace the
criminal sanctions found in New York's Environmental Protection Law
before enactment of chapter 671 ,235 and it is doubtful that chapter 671 will
change this reluctance. The amendment provides important provisions to
increase the likelihood of criminal convictions and meaningful penalties, but
they stop short of their fullest potential impact.
Chapter 671 provides specific definitions of hazardous waste which will
let corporate officers determine whether discharge of waste will be unlawful
and will ease the prosecutor's burden of determining whether the waste was
hazardous."3 6 The amendment also provides an affirmative defense to the
corporate officer who has made a decision in accordance with the provisions
of a valid permit.2 7 If a valid permit authorizes the discharge, the corpo-
rate officer has not violated any regulations. These provisions will possibly
reduce the frequency of violations and will undoubtedly ease the prosecu-
tor's burden when attempting to convict violators. Unfortunately, the
amendment does not include provisions which would result in the convic-
tions of as many violators, and deter as many future violators, as possible.
Several additional provisions are needed beyond those in New York's
new Environmental Conservation Law if a statutory scheme is to effectively
convict corporate officers who are responsible for the unlawful release of
hazardous waste, and thus deter future violators. First, the amendment
should contain minimum fines, as given in twelve state statutes,23 8 and min-
imum periods of incarceration, as six states provide.23 9 While these mini-
235. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text. See also Memorandum, supra note
13; Comment, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV., supra note 13, at 102.
236. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 12 (amended N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
237. Ch. 671, supra note 12, § 17 (adds a new § 71-2720 to N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 1-0101 to 72-0602 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988)).
238. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25189.5(b)-(d), 25191(a),(d) (West Supp.
1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6309(f),(g) (1983 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-13-3(a) (West
Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.994(4) (Baldwin 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
260.425(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.99 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-2011 (West Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.606 (Purdon
Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-114(a)(1) (1987); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4477-7, §§ 8(b)(1)(A)-(E) (Vernon Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.090
(Supp. 1987).
239. ALA. CODE § 22-30-19(c) (Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-82(a)(l)-(5),(b)
(Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.994(6) (Baldwin 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3734.99 (Baldwin 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.606 (Purdon Supp. 1987); W. VA.
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mum sanctions would not guarantee that every fine and prison term are
considered a penalty by the convicted corporate officer, this provision would
increase the likelihood that the corporate officer would consider the sanction
a penalty. In addition, statutes should order the sentencing judge to con-
sider the corporate officer's assets before imposing a fine. This order to con-
sider an officer's assets would increase the likelihood that each offender will
feel the sting of a penalty.
Third, as Maryland has done, legislation should eliminate the statute
of limitations. 4 0 Discarders of hazardous waste often conceal the waste
carefully; thus, it is not discovered for many years. 241 The lapse of time
should not erase liability for hazardous waste crimes. Indeed, in many in-
stances the lapse of time brings the liability to its fruition, as when hazard-
ous waste finally corrodes through its container, seeps into ground water,
and is finally discovered. Also, identification of the violator may consume
many years past the discovery date of the violation. Legislation should thus
also exclude after-the-fact statutes of limitations. Fourth, after a prosecutor
convicts a corporate officer for violating legislative criminal regulations, im-
position of the sanctions should be mandatory, pre-empting any civil penal-
ties. Mandatory imposition of criminal sanctions would deter future viola-
tors more effectively, an important purpose of criminal sanctions. 24 2
Effective legislation should include five additional provisions. First, leg-
islation should forbid indemnification of the convicted corporate officer by
his or her corporation.2 4 Indemnification is admittedly difficult to patrol;
however, examination of the officer's and corporation's financial records
should reveal any indemnification. Second, legislation should deprive the
convicted corporate officer of any corporate management position in any
corporation for a period of at least two years.2 4 Deprivation of any corpo-
rate management position for a convicted corporate officer is necessary be-
cause many of these individuals merely jump from the courtroom to an-
other corporate management position. 45 This jump to another management
position does not deter or prevent the environmental criminal from contin-
ued criminal conduct. Legislation must eliminate the criminal's forum for a
period of time during which he or she may consider the repercussions of
any future violations. Third, legislation needs explicit language which states
that courts should apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil of the
CODE §§ 20-5E-15(a),(c),(d) (1985).
240. MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-265 (1987).
241. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 15.
242. See supra notes 95, 201.
243. See supra note 233.
244. See M. CLINARD, supra note 11, at 221 (argument made for corporate crimes in
general).
245. See M. CLINARD, supra note 11, at 221.
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subsidiary corporation and its parent when sufficient evidence for applica-
tion of the doctrine exists." Piercing these corporate veils would let the
courts punish the responsible corporate officer. 47 Legislation should also re-
quire that corporate officers responsible for the unlawful release of hazard-
ous waste that damages others provide restitution to such parties, as New
Jersey has done. 2" Restitution by violators guarantees some financial loss
by the violator, elimination of the harm caused, and possibly instills shame
in the violator's conscience. Finally, state legislation should pre-empt local
sewer regulations. These sewer regulations are frequently much more leni-
ent than state regulations, and allow the release of dangerous substances
that can reach water used for human use and consumption." 9
In summary, the favored provisions of New York, supplemented with
additional provisions, including some from Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, and Illinois, would create legislation which would successfully
achieve the purpose emphasized by the heavily industrialized state of New
York. This legislation would further the conviction of environmental
criminals and deter environmental abuse in an effort to conserve limited
environmental resources,2 5 0 and achieve the general legislative purpose of
protecting the environment.2 51
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress and the states have provided, to varying degrees, extensive
criminal sanctions against individuals and corporations that unlawfully dis-
card hazardous waste. Federal and state courts, however, have been reluc-
tant to utilize these sanctions. The criminal fines and incarceration provided
by legislatures are either not imposed by the courts or are imposed at such
minimal levels that they do not constitute punishment. When a sanction
does not punish, the important deterrent value is lost. Conservation is the
main goal of environmental legislation, which is aimed at protecting the
environment, and deterrence is the vehicle for realizing that purpose.
The New York legislature has recently amended its Environmental
Protection Act in an attempt to facilitate the conviction of individual and
corporate hazardous waste offenders. The amendment wisely provides a
more specific definition of hazardous waste that allows for more informed
246. See supra notes 59, 218, 221 and accompanying text. Sufficient evidence must
show that the sole or primary reason for the existence of the subsidiary is to insulate individu-
als within the parent corporation from liability for unlawful releases of hazardous waste.
247. Id.
248. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3(f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
249. D. REBOVICH, supra note 3, at 4.
250. Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 11, at 3; see also Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, supra note !1.
251. See supra note 11.
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corporate decision-making and that provides an absolute defense to those
operating under the provisions of a valid permit. Furthermore, New York
has specifically delineated various offense classifications which will aid pros-
ecutors and the courts in determining appropriate sanctions to be imposed.
The amendment also provides a penalty of double the amount of the of-
fender's gain.
New York, however, has not incorporated the provisions needed to ef-
fectively punish violators. Effective legislation, based on New York's statu-
tory framework, would include seven provisions in addition to the three
favorable ones recently offered by New York's chapter 671. First, legisla-
tion should include minimum levels of fines and incarceration, as Illinois
and Maryland provide. In addition, the sentencing judge should be ordered
to consider the corporate officer's assets before imposing a fine. Third, as in
Maryland, the statute of limitations for hazardous waste crime should be
eliminated. Fourth, criminal sanctions should be mandatory after the con-
viction of a corporate officer. Legislation should also not allow indemnifica-
tion by a corporation of its corporate officer who has been convicted of a
hazardous waste regulatory violation. Sixth, legislation should not let a con-
victed corporate officer return to any corporate management position with
any corporation for at least two years. Statutory language should, in addi-
tion, encourage piercing of the corporate veil of subsidiary corporations and
their parents to allow for the imposition of criminal sanctions on the respon-
sible officer(s) within the parent corporation. Finally, legislation should re-
quire that the responsible corporate officer provide restitution to any parties
damaged by the unlawful release of hazardous waste.
With the recent amendments to its Environmental Protection Law, the
New York legislature has told the New York prosecutors and courts to in-
crease conviction of corporate officers who engage in hazardous waste crim-
inal activity. The current New York Environmental Protection Law pro-
vides a good start towards deterring corporate officers who violate
hazardous waste regulations. However, the adequate legislative regulation
of hazardous waste requires additional features. The proposed statutory
scheme will satisfy the goals of punishment and provide for wiser use of our
limited environmental resources. If states amend their hazardous waste
statutes in accordance with this proposal, they will become leaders in pro-
tecting our environment and maintaining adequate resources for the contin-
ued physical and economic well-being of this nation.
BRETT L. WARNING
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